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Ending Perpetual War?  
Constitutional War Termination Powers 
and the Conflict Against Al Qaeda 
David A. Simon* 
This Article presents a framework for interpreting the constitutional war 
termination powers of Congress and the President and applies this 
framework to questions involving how and when the war against Al Qaeda 
and associated forces could end.  Although constitutional theory and 
practice suggest the validity of congressional actions to initiate war, the 
issue of Congress’s constitutional role in ending war has received little 
attention in scholarly debates.  Theoretically, this Article contends that 
terminating war without meaningful cooperation between the President and 
Congress generates tension with the principle of the separation of powers 
underpinning the U.S. constitutional system, with the Framers’ division of 
the treaty-making authority, and with the values they enshrine.  Practically, 
this Article suggests that although the participation of both Congress and 
the President in the war termination process may make it more difficult to 
end a war, such cooperative political branch action ensures greater 
transparency and accountability in this constitutional process.  This Article 
also examines normative questions about the role of the President and 
Congress in exercising their respective war termination powers, and argues 
that the treaty-making process represents an approach to war termination 
that best reflects the constitutional values of the interdependence of the 
political branches, while checking interbranch rivalry and preserving the 
constitutional and foreign relations prerogatives of Congress and the 
 
 *  Special Counsel to the General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of 
Defense; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.Phil., Oxford University, Trinity College; B.A., University of 
Minnesota.  I am grateful to Brian Finucane, Jack Goldsmith, Oona Hathaway, David Koplow, Rob 
Park, Daniel Pastor, Peter Raven-Hansen, Jane Stromseth, and Zachary Tripp for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts, and colloquia participants at George Washington Law School.  
Statements included herein are my personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or its components.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States has ended its combat mission in Iraq, is winding 
down the war in Afghanistan,1 and has begun looking toward a “tipping 
point” in the conflict against Al Qaeda and associated forces.2  How does 
war end as a matter of U.S. constitutional law?  Which branch of 
government has the power to end war in the American constitutional 
 
 1.  See Remarks by President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2014 
(Referring to U.S. plans to end major combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, 
President Obama stated: “Together with our allies, we will complete our mission there by the end of 
this year, and America’s longest war will finally be over.”); Barack Obama, President of the U.S., 
Weekly Address: Ending the War in Afghanistan and Rebuilding America, Remarks at the White 
House (Jan. 12, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/01/12/weekly-address-ending-war-afghanistan-and-rebuilding-america) (“[B]y the end 
of next year, America’s war in Afghanistan will be over.”).   
 2.  See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks of President Barack Obama (May 23, 
2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-barack-obama) (“Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must 
continue.  But this war, like all wars, must end.  That’s what history advises.  That’s what our 
democracy demands.”); see also Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., The 
Conflict Against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End? (Nov. 30, 2012) (transcript available 
at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/).   
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system?  Unlike the Declare War Clause3—which vests the power to create a 
de jure state of war in the legislative branch—there is no clear vesting of the 
peace power in the Constitution.  To what extent should Congress and the 
President collaborate to bring a war to an end?  Is the power to end war 
shared between the Senate and the President as part of the treaty power?  
This Article presents a framework for interpreting the constitutional war 
termination powers of Congress and the President. 
During the Constitutional Convention, Oliver Ellsworth remarked that 
“[i]t should be more easy to get out of war than into it.”4  His desire has 
come to fruition: decisions to initiate war are wrought with scholarly, 
political, and legal debate from the living room to the halls of Congress.  
Decisions regarding whether to terminate war are no less politically fraught, 
but the attendant domestic legal issues are not as frequently discussed and 
have not been entirely resolved. 
Consider two hypothetical scenarios in which Congress and the 
President have divergent views concerning the necessity of initiating a war 
or continuing to wage an existing war.  If Israel were, for example, to strike 
Iranian nuclear facilities, and Iran retaliated against Israel, it is conceivable 
that the President might direct U.S. forces to take military action against Iran 
in collective self-defense of Israel.  But if Congress wished to end the war 
before it started—and a veto-proof majority of legislators passed a joint 
resolution declaring an end to the nascent war—there would be a 
constitutional question of which branch’s will ought to prevail in what might 
otherwise be an interbranch foreign policy dispute.  Alternatively, for 
example, if the President proclaimed an end to the “armed conflict” against 
Al Qaeda and associated forces, but Congress did not repeal the 2001 
 
 3.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 4.  See JAMES MADISON, The DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL . . . 439 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1876) (“There is a material difference 
between the cases of making war and making peace.  It should be more easy to get out of war than 
into it.  War, also, is a simple and overt declaration; peace, attended with intricate and secret 
negotiations.”).  Ellsworth spoke during the deliberations over whether the congressional war power 
should be characterized as the power to “make war” or to “declare war.”  See id.  The general mood 
of the founders was that the deliberative process would ensure wars were not entered into hastily, but 
that the word “declare” would allow the President to retain the power to repel attacks against the 
nation.  Id.  Ellsworth seems to be in favor of a congressional power to declare war, but it is less 
clear whether he opposed a congressional peace power; however, the reference to intricate 
negotiations and the following unsuccessful vote to vest a congressional peace power in Article I, § 
8 of the Constitution suggests that he did not favor such a power.  See id.  See generally U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8. 
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Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) against these organizations,5 
some might contend that the cessation of hostilities in this armed conflict—
or at least the presidential or legislative recognition thereof—would require 
the relatively immediate release of Guantanamo detainees.  Could Congress, 
in such a scenario, prevent the release of detainees after the war had 
effectively been terminated?  In such situations, the locus of the 
constitutional authority to terminate the war is not crystal clear. 
This Article concludes that terminating war without meaningful 
cooperation between the President and Congress generates tension with the 
Framers’ division of the treaty-making authority, with the principle of the 
separation of powers that underpins the American constitutional system, and 
with the values they enshrine.  In addition, this Article advances the 
normative argument that wars between States should be terminated by 
treaty.6 
First, the Framers did not design a constitutional system of checks and 
balances that encourages one political branch seeking to end a war to do so 
without involving the other political branch.7  Under certain circumstances, 
the exercise of unilateral congressional war termination power may generate 
friction with the Commander in Chief power, as well as with the President’s 
foreign relations power.  Similarly, under certain circumstances, executive 
action to end war may generate tension with Congress’s power to declare 
war and control its funding.8 
Presidents, however, have used sole executive agreements to conclude 
international agreements unilaterally since the early days of the American 
republic.9  In the absence of a clear constitutional provision for declaring 
 
 5.  See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
[hereinafter “2001 AUMF”]. 
 6.  This position is reflected in Justice Samuel Chase’s observation, in Ware v. Hylton, 
concerning the 1783 Treaty of Paris between the U.S. and Great Britain:   
A right to make peace, necessarily includes the power of determining on what terms 
peace shall be made.  A power to make treaties must of necessity imply a power, to 
decide the terms on which they shall be made.  A war between two nations can only be 
concluded by treaty.  
3 U.S. 199, 236 (1796).   
 7.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”); see also Adam Heder, The Power to End War: The Extent and Limits of Congressional 
Power, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 445, 459 (2010). 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, 2. 
 9.  See infra Section II.B. 
[Vol. 41: 685, 2014] Ending Perpetual War? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
690 
peace, the wars waged by the founding generation against States were all 
ended by peace treaties10 (since peace treaties were the customary method of 
ending interstate war for much of the first part of U.S. history).11  Before 
World War II, congressional approval of formal peace treaties was the 
standard practice for major wars.12  Since 1945, however, as the United 
States has engaged in more frequent military operations of limited duration 
and amounting to hostilities below the threshold of war, presidents have 
ended wars unilaterally—often without any formal legal termination 
agreement.13  At the same time, and particularly in the last few decades, it is 
commonplace for the executive branch to conclude international agreements 
without congressional approval.14  From 1980 to 2000, for example, 
presidents unilaterally entered into more than 500 security-related 
agreements—including numerous status of forces agreements with foreign 
countries.15  There is, thus, a strong trend of post-World War II 
congressional acquiescence in the face of unilateral presidential action to 
conclude international agreements—including as part of efforts to terminate 
wars.16  Such historical pattern of congressional acquiescence and executive 
action supports the contention that the President’s authority to terminate 
wars unilaterally through executive agreements and presidential 
proclamations has increased in the period since World War II.17 
Second, this interdependence functions as a constructive impediment to 
efforts by either political branch to become the predominant actor in war 
powers disputes.18  Justice Robert Jackson stated, in his famous concurring 
 
 10.  See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93D CONG., CONGRESS AND THE TERMINATION OF THE 
VIETNAM WAR 3 (Comm. Print 1973) (discussing how the declared, undeclared, and de facto wars 
the United States entered into tended to be concluded by peace treaties: in particular, the quasi-war 
with France, the War of 1812, and the Barbary Wars were ended by peace treaties).   
 11.  See John M. Mathews, The Termination of War, 19 MICH. L. REV. 819, 823 (1921) (citing 
examples for the proposition that peace treaties are generally recognized as the method of ending 
wars between nations). 
 12.  See infra notes 36–102 and accompanying text; see also Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: 
The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 
1287 (2008); 93 C.J.S. War and National Defense § 51 (2013). 
 13.  See infra Part II.A.3; see also Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1287. 
 14.  Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1260. 
 15.  Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1260; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A 
LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON 
JANUARY 1, 2012 (2012). 
 16.  See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 18.  See infra Part VI.D. 
[Vol. 41: 685, 2014] Ending Perpetual War? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
691 
opinion in Youngstown, that the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches 
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”19  The 
interdependent relationship between Congress and the President is a crucial 
element of our system of constitutional war powers, and with respect to war 
termination, it encourages and catalyzes interbranch reciprocation and 
collaboration.20  In order to maintain this interdependence, the constitutional 
design envisions that the two branches should cooperate and work together 
even while exercising their independent powers.21  Indeed, through various 
forms of consultation, cooperation, and bargaining, the political branches 
maintain a healthy degree of interdependence in fulfilling their constitutional 
roles in the war initiation and termination processes.22   
Finally, the participation of both Congress and the President in the war 
termination process may make it more difficult to terminate a war, but this 
constitutional process has the political benefit of ensuring more transparent 
and accountable decision-making.23  For example, whether unilateral branch 
action is any swifter in practice remains an open question; the Vietnam War 
took years to end despite congressional assertions of power.24  
Part II examines the history of U.S. war termination, and discusses 
constitutional patterns and themes that bear on the exercise of presidential 
and congressional war termination powers.  Part II begins with the Founding 
Era, demonstrating that during the first 100 years of U.S. history Congress 
and the President played formal roles in the termination of war—primarily 
through the peace treaty-making process.  Concerted efforts to conclude 
World War I seemingly put an end to the routine practice of terminating 
wars with peace treaties—a practice that survived through World War II but 
has not been common since.  The creation of the United Nations and the 
adoption of the U.N. Charter after World War II ushered in an era in which 
congressional declarations of war appear to be relics of a prior age, and in 
which Congress’s war termination role is less prominent, though no less 
 
 19.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 20.  See infra notes 366–70 and accompanying text. 
 21.  See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 22.  See Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent 
Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 393 (2008) (stating that “Congress and the 
President have concurrent power to conduct warfare that has been authorized by Congress,” but 
ultimately concluding that Congress can control many elements of warfare). 
 23.  See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 24.  See infra notes 152–57 and accompanying text. 
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significant. 
Part III addresses two misconceptions pertinent to interpreting 
constitutional war termination powers.  First, Part III shows that Congress 
does not have the power under the Declare War Clause to terminate war 
unilaterally.  Although the Constitution assigns Congress the power “to 
Declare War,”25 that does not necessarily mean that the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to declare peace.  To the extent that the Congress has an 
implied war termination power under the Declare War Clause, it should be 
exercised in tandem with its concurrent treaty power.  Second, Part III shows 
that the President does not have the constitutional authority to terminate war 
unilaterally by treaty.  Notwithstanding the President’s broad unilateral 
authority to execute sole executive agreements concerning foreign affairs 
matters, founding history and case law reflect the substantial extent to which 
the power to make peace treaties is not meant to be held exclusively by the 
President. 
Part IV provides an analytical framework for understanding the 
constitutional roles of the President and Congress in terminating wars.  First, 
Part IV examines the necessity of presidential involvement in war 
termination and argues that the President is an indispensable actor.  Second, 
Part IV shows that Congress’s purse power should not be a war termination 
power of first resort—contending that Congress ought to first exhaust 
alternate cooperative remedies.  Third, Part IV identifies and analyzes 
patterns of rivalry and aggrandizement that disrupt the constitutional war 
termination process.  Finally, Part IV shows that the unilateral exercise of 
war termination power by one political branch provokes aggrandizement by 
the other political branch.  Accordingly, Part IV argues that the treaty-
making process represents an approach to war termination that best reflects 
the constitutional values of the interdependence of the political branches, 
while checking interbranch rivalry and preserving the constitutional and 
foreign relations prerogatives of Congress and the President.  
Part V applies the analytical framework from Part IV to one important 
set of questions that would arise as the armed conflict with Al Qaeda and 
associated forces comes to an end, including the question of which branch of 
the federal government should have the final say in determining whether an 
armed conflict has ended.  The Constitution does not explicitly address war 
termination powers, and there are few, if any, definitive guiding precedents 
 
 25.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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on this question.  First, Part V focuses on the significant roles that both 
political branches should play in resolving legal questions associated with 
the termination of the “armed conflict” with Al Qaeda.  Next, Part V 
explains that there exists sparse judicial guidance from the Supreme Court 
regarding whether a war has been terminated.  Part V explains that, 
historically, wars ended through peace treaties; however, in the post-World 
War II era, Congress has played a passive role or been largely absent from 
the process of determining whether an armed conflict has ended.  Part V 
goes on to summarize prudential arguments in favor of broader 
congressional engagement—such as promoting the constitutional system of 
checks and balances, which would be gained from some level of interbranch 
cooperation.  The degree of congressional engagement, however, which may 
take place through a range of formal and informal mechanisms, may vary 
greatly.   
Three caveats are appropriate before proceeding: First, this Article does 
not address the termination of hostilities short of war, including the hundreds 
of instances in which the U.S. has used its armed forces abroad.26  
Notwithstanding the absence of a definition of “war” in the Constitution’s 
text,27 this Article assumes a definition of “war” in the domestic 
constitutional sense.28  For the purposes of the Declare War Clause, “war” 
includes military operations undertaken that are extensive in nature, 
duration, and scope.29  At the margins, this Article’s definition of “war” 
 
 26.  Examples of hostilities short of war include the bombardment of Greyton, Nicaragua in 
1854; the noncombatant evacuation operations in Liberia in the 1990s; air strikes in Libya in 1986; 
as well as cruise missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.  See Peter J. Spiro, Old 
Wars/New Wars, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 734 (1996) (highlighting “a number of lesser 
nineteenth-century engagements”); see also RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL32170, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2009 (2010) 
(cataloguing the use of U.S. forces abroad). 
 27.  See Proposed Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Bosn. 19 Op. O.L.C. 327, 330–31 
(1995) (“The scope and limits of that power are not well defined by constitutional text, case law, or 
statute.  Rather, the relationship of Congress’s power to declare war and the President’s authority as 
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive has been clarified by two hundred years of practice.”). 
 28.  The most recent definition of “war” in the constitutional sense articulated by the executive 
branch that triggers a requirement for congressional authorization exists only in the case of 
“prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military 
personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”  See Authority to Use Military Force in 
Libya, 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 8 (2011).  Regarding the use of force in Libya, OLC also concluded “the 
limited military operations the President anticipated directing were not a ‘war’ for constitutional 
purposes.”  Id. at 13. 
 29.  See id. at 6–9.  Consent of the government of the country involved may also be a factor. See 
Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 177–78 (1994) (“[The Haiti] 
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includes some instances of limited war (such as the Quasi-War with France) 
in which Congress authorizes major hostilities, either pursuant to a formal 
declaration of war or pursuant to some other form of legislative 
authorization for the use of military forces.30  Additionally, this conception 
of war in the constitutional sense includes instances in which force used 
against the United States, or threats thereof, triggers the defensive war 
powers of the President31 (or individual states)32 to repel attacks.  In 
assessing the nature, duration, and scope of a given war, this Article attempts 
to account for the character of the U.S. forces deployed, the magnitude of 
the force deployed, whether the military operations involved “boots on the 
ground,” and the probability of U.S. or enemy forces being killed in action. 
Second, this Article does not examine the constitutional implications of 
concluding armistice agreements or otherwise terminating fighting without 
ending a formal state of war. 
Third, this Article does not attempt to analyze the means of war 
termination for purposes of international law.  Such an undertaking would 
require distinguishing the meanings of actions by Congress and the President 
to initiate and terminate war under international law from their respective 
 
deployment was characterized by circumstances that sufficed to show that the operation was not a 
‘war’ within the meaning of the Declaration of War Clause.  The deployment was to have taken 
place, and did in fact take place, with the full consent of the legitimate government of the country 
involved.  Taking that and other circumstances into account, the President, together with his military 
and intelligence advisors, determined that the nature, scope and duration of the deployment were not 
consistent with the conclusion that the event was a ‘war.”’ (footnotes omitted)).  
 30.  See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40–45 (1800).  During the Quasi-War with France, for example, 
Congress authorized armed U.S. ships to attack, seize, and take as prize armed French vessels.  Id. at 
42.  Justice Bushrod Washington found the hostilities to be an “imperfect war,” but a constitutional 
war nonetheless, where “the degree of hostility meant to be carried on [(American vessels 
interdicting French vessels)], was sufficiently described without declaring war.”  Id. at 40–41.  He 
contrasted limited war to the “perfect war” that is declared, where “one whole nation is at war with 
another whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war, are authorised [sic] to 
commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every 
circumstance.”  Id. at 40.  Some scholars, however, disagree with the contemporary analysis 
regarding the constitutional meaning of “war,” contending that the Founders believed that the 
Declare War Clause encompassed more military actions than now recognized.  See, e.g., Saikrishna 
Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by “Declare War,” 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 67 (2007). 
 31.  See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) (“If a war be made by invasion of a 
foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.  He does not 
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative 
authority.”). 
 32.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . 
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”). 
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meanings under U.S. domestic law, including an assessment of the definition 
of “war” under international law.  Another reason for focusing on war 
termination under domestic law is that, even assuming a common definition 
of “war” under both domestic and international law, the legal conditions of 
war created under domestic and international law may not end at the same 
time or in the same way. 
Despite the methodological limits on the nature and scope of this 
Article, the constitutional framework for interpreting the roles of the 
President and Congress in terminating armed conflicts warrants a more 
searching analysis than it has received. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL WAR TERMINATION POWERS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
A.  Historical Turning Points 
1.  Founding to World War I: Peace Treaties As the Predominate Mode 
of War Termination 
The first 100 years of war in the U.S. were remarkably uniform: 
Congress would declare war; the President would negotiate a peace treaty 
that was advised and consented to by the Senate.  Congress and the President 
both played formal roles in the termination of war.  The Civil War and 
Quasi-War with France were the exceptions that established precedent for 
alternative forms of war initiation and termination.  In particular, the 
Supreme Court began to acknowledge the import of presidential 
proclamations for termination of war during the Civil War. 
In the Supreme Court’s first case that implicated war termination after 
the U.S. Constitution was ratified, Ware v. Hylton, Justice Samuel Chase 
noted that wars between states could only be officially terminated through 
the treaty process, observing that “[a] war between two nations can only be 
concluded by treaty.”33  The case concerned a private debt nullification 
provision in the 1783 Treaty of Paris between the U.S. and Great Britain, 
and Justice Chase made the statement in the context of discussing the 
supremacy of Congress vis-à-vis a state under the Articles of Confederation, 
 
 33.  3 U.S. 199, 236 (1796). 
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which specifically gave Congress the power to determine peace.34  Each 
Justice wrote a separate opinion; so his statement was dictum, and did not 
necessarily reflect the view of the majority of the Court.35  Still, early history 
supports the view that only treaties can end declared wars. 
a.  Indian Wars 
Although the Indian Wars were undeclared wars with non-state actors, 
Congress played an important role in determining the duration and the end 
of the war.  Treaties, such as the 1795 Treaty of Greenville, played a 
significant role in their termination.36   
In addition, Congress’s active legislative role in providing conditional 
appropriations during the Indian Wars reflects the historical role Congress 
has played in exercising its purse power to influence the duration of a given 
armed conflict.  In 1789, for example, Congress responded to President 
Washington’s request to defend the Western Frontiers by authorizing 
General Arthur St. Clair (who had been appointed the governor of the 
Northwest Territory) to call up the frontier militia; however, the 
congressional authorization included explicit durational limits to ensure that 
the authorization lasted for less than a year—”until the end of the next 
session of Congress, and no longer.”37   
After General Arthur St. Clair’s and General Josiah Harmar’s forces 
suffered a significant defeat on the battlefield, President Washington 
requested a surge of funding from Congress to bolster the war effort.38  
Congress responded with detailed appropriations—”one hundred thousand 
dollars, for defraying the expenses of an expedition lately carried on against 
certain Indian tribes”39—to provide pay, subsistence, and rations for 1,700 
militia and for 400 continental forces for three months.40  Congress soon 
 
 34.  Id. at 220–22. 
 35.  See generally 3 U.S. 199. 
 36.  The United States signed and ratified the Treaty of Greenville in 1795.  See, e.g., Treaty of 
Greenville, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49; State v. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Minn. 1980) (“The 
treaty [of Greenville] established peace, provided for the return of prisoners, and set a boundary line 
between the lands of the United States and the lands of the Indian Tribes.”). 
 37.  Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 6, 1 Stat. 95–96. 
 38.  See generally Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq 
and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 480–81 (2011). 
 39.  Act of Feb. 9, 1791, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 190. 
 40.  Alexander Hamilton, Estimates for 1791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FINANCE 
82, 87 (1832).  
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authorized appropriations again for additional infantry to protect the frontier, 
but only “for one year.”41  After the Indians again defeated St. Clair, 
President Washington once again requested support from Congress, which 
appropriated $532,449.76 and two-thirds cents in response.42  Significantly, 
however, the next year, after a series of detailed appropriations, Congress 
eventually granted President Washington the broader authority to call up 
militia whenever the United States was invaded or “in imminent danger of 
invasion by any foreign nation or Indian tribe.”43   
b.  Quasi-War with France 
America’s first war with a European power after the ratification of the 
U.S. Constitution was actually a limited, undeclared conflict entirely 
authorized by Congress.44  Known as the Quasi-War with France, in 1798, 
Congress—at the invitation of President John Adams—terminated various 
treaties with France45 and passed several acts that authorized U.S. ships to 
capture vessels on the high seas, but not attack French territory.46  The 
Supreme Court observed that the Quasi-War was not “the perfect kind” in 
which “one whole nation is at war with another whole nation.”47  Instead, “it 
 
 41.  Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 28, § 15, 1 Stat. 222.  
 42.  Act of Dec. 23, 1791, ch. 3,, § 4, 1 Stat. 226.  
 43.  Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28. § 1, 1 Stat. 264.  
 44.  See Quasi-War with France, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://future.state.gov/when/timeline/ 
1784_timeline/quasiwar_withfrance.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 45.  See Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578 (declaring that “the United States are of right 
freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties, and of the consular convention, heretofore 
concluded between the United States and France; and that the same shall not henceforth be regarded 
as legally obligatory on the government or citizens of the United States.”).  President Adams, 
however, did not provide France formal notice of termination of the treaties, and France continued to 
insist the treaties were in force as late as 1800.  See Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886) 
(recounting the negotiations of 1800). 
 46.  Although Congress did not authorize U.S. forces to attack French territory, it passed four 
separate acts allowing U.S. ships “[t]o resist the search of a French public vessel,” to “capture any 
vessel that should attempt, by force, to compel submission to a search,” to “re-capture any American 
vessel seized by a French vessel,” and to “capture any French armed vessel wherever found on the 
high seas.”  See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 44 (1800) (opinion of Washington, J.); Ackerman & 
Hathaway, supra note 38, at 454.  David Barron and Martin Lederman discussed the Quasi-War at 
some length and argued that the Supreme Court has concluded repeatedly that “included within 
Congress’s authorizations for the use of military force in an undeclared war are implied statutory 
limitations on the Commander in Chief’s war powers that must be followed.”  See David J. Barron & 
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 941, 968 (2008) (emphasis omitted).  
 47.  Bas, 4 U.S. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.). 
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was an ‘imperfect war’ in which ‘hostilities . . . subsist between two nations 
more confined in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, 
and things’ and in which ‘those who are authorised [sic] to commit 
hostilities, act under special authority, and can go no farther than to the 
extent of their commission.’”48  The Quasi-War established early precedent 
for Congress to authorize limited war without formally declaring war on 
another state (although this practice did not become routine until after World 
War II).49  Interestingly, the war was terminated via a ratified peace treaty—
the Convention of 1800, also known as the Treaty of Mortefontaine—
thereby involving both the President and the Senate.50  
Though the Quasi-War was authorized by normal acts of Congress, 
whether Congress could terminate the war by the same process is an open 
question.  The Court seemed willing to enforce congressional conditions of 
the authorization to use force, even where the President might have been 
able to act in the absence of special authorization.51  This bolsters the 
argument that Congress has the power to repeal constitutionally enacted 
laws using the normal legislative process.52  
Not only did Congress authorize the Quasi-War with France, but it also 
played an active role—through the legislative authorization and 
appropriation process—in limiting the authority, scope, and duration of the 
conflict.53  In May 1798, Congress authorized the President to act against 
armed vessels that had committed or were attempting to commit 
“depredations” on U.S. vessels and to recapture U.S. vessels.54  One month 
later, Congress authorized private, armed U.S. vessels to use force in 
defending against any search, restraint, or seizure by French vessels.55  Once 
again, within a month Congress authorized the President to use private U.S. 
 
 48.  Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 38, at 453–54 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bas, 4 U.S. 
at 40); see also Bas, 4 U.S. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.).  
 49.  MICHAEL LIND, VIETNAM: THE NECESSARY WAR: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICA’S 
MOST DISASTROUS MILITARY CONFLICT (1999). 
 50.  See Treaty of Mortefontaine, U.S.-Fr., Dec. 21, 1801, 8 Stat. 178.   
 51.  See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 177 (1804). 
 52.  This argument is not entirely coherent.  Congress could not admit a state and then repeal the 
legislation that admitted it.  See Mark W. Mosier, The Power to Declare Peace Unilaterally, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1609, 1626 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 53.   See, e.g., Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613; Act of July 9, 1798, ch. LXVIII, § 1.2, 1 
Stat. 578; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. LXV, § 1, 1 Stat. 572; Act of May 28, 1798, ch. XLVIII, 1 Stat. 
561. 
 54.  See Act of May 28, 1798, ch. XLVIII, 1 Stat. 561. 
 55.  See Act of June 25, 1798, ch. LXV, § 1, 1 Stat. 572. 
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vessels and to grant special commissions to private U.S. vessels to capture 
armed French vessels.56  And six months thereafter, in February 1799, 
Congress granted the President the additional authority to seize U.S. vessels 
in route to French ports.57  Not only did Congress impose legislative limits 
on the particular ships that would be subject to U.S. capture, but Congress 
also limited the use of particular ships58 and the personnel deployed on each 
frigate,59 and regulated the treatment of civilians on shore60 and the detention 
of prisoners captured on French vessels.61  This series of narrow 
congressional appropriations in short succession, reflects the active role 
Congress can play in shaping the conduct of hostilities—however limited—
and arguably, buttresses the contention that Congress can and should play a 
meaningful role in determining when wars end. 
Even where the war was undeclared, Congress and the President chose 
to rely on the formal treaty tool utilized in declared wars.62  The use of a 
peace treaty to end the Quasi-War is a strong indication that the political 
branches viewed peace treaties, at the very least, as important processes to 
ending war with other states.  The Quasi-War experience might also suggest 
that undeclared wars should only be terminated through a peace treaty. 
c.  War of 1812 
In 1812—at the request of President James Madison—Congress 
declared war for the first time; officially starting the War of 1812 against the 
United Kingdom.63  After over a year of fighting, President Madison agreed 
to peace talks in the neutral city of Ghent in Belgium (where the U.S. 
 
 56.  See Act of July 9, 1798, ch. LXVIII, § 1–2, 1 Stat. 578.  
 57.  See Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613.  
 58.  See Act Providing a Naval Armament, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 523 (1797).  
 59.  See id. at 524 (“That there shall be employed on board each of the ships of forty-four guns, 
one captain, four lieutenants, two lieutenants of marines, one chaplain, one surgeon, and two 
surgeon’s mates.”).  
 60.  See Act Vesting the Power of Retaliation, in Certain Cases, in the President of the United 
States, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 743 (1799). 
 61.  See Act to Further Protect the Commerce of the United States, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578 (1798).  
 62.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 63.  See Act of June 24, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755.  President Madison asked for a congressional 
declaration of war on June 1, 1812, and the U.S. House passed the declaration on June 4, 1812, 
followed by the Senate on June 17, 1812.  See id.  President Madison signed the declaration on June 
18, 1812.  See id. 
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delegation was led by John Quincy Adams).64  Negotiations commenced in 
August of 1814, and the peace treaty was signed on December 24, 1814.65  
The Senate then provided advice and consent to the Treaty of Ghent on 
February 17, 1815, thereby terminating the war.66  The war was a model of 
the formal state-based conflicts of the nineteenth century, seen both in the 
Mexican-American War and the Spanish-American War: it began with a 
congressional declaration of war and ended with a peace treaty.67  The broad 
authorization to use force found in the declaration of war was used in future 
congressional war declarations, as well as, in congressional authorizations of 
undeclared wars.68  The War of 1812 set a precedent for the formal roles of 
Congress and the President in both the initiation and termination of war that 
would be applied to subsequent U.S. wars until the twentieth century.69 
d.  Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars 
The Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars demonstrate that a 
cease-fire agreement, agreed to without congressional involvement, does not 
constitute a formal war termination agreement.  The Mexican-American War 
was not definitively terminated by the cease-fire agreement, or by the 
suspension of hostilities; like the War of 1812, it was ended by the senatorial 
consent to a peace treaty signed by a representative of the executive 
branch.70  After the U.S. annexed Texas in June 1845, President Polk ordered 
a military buildup near Mexico, in March 1846, to protect U.S. interests in 
Texas,71 and Congress declared war on Mexico on May 11, 1846.72  U.S. 
military operations against Mexico were successful, and after heavy fighting 
 
 64.  See DONALD R. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A FORGOTTEN CONFLICT 285 (2012). 
 65.  See Treaty of Peace and Amity, Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of 
America (Treaty of Ghent), U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IX, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218. 
 66.  See id. 
 67.  See infra Part II.A.1.d. 
 68.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2073–75 (2005). 
 69.  See infra Parts II.A.1.d, II.B. 
 70.  See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 71.  See Joseph G. Dawson III, The U.S. War with Mexico: The Difficulties of Concluding a 
Victorious War, in BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: HOW AMERICA ENDS ITS WARS 85 (Matthew 
Moten, ed., 2011). 
 72.  President Polk asked for a congressional declaration of war on May 11, 1846.  Congress 
passed a resolution that declared war against Mexico the two days later.  See Act of May 13, 1846, 
ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9. The President then signed the declaration of war on May 13, 1846.  Id.   
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in Mexico City the two sides signed a cease-fire agreement on August 24, 
1847; however, the cease-fire agreement was terminated on September 6, 
1847.73  In August of 1847, representatives of the Mexican government and 
Nicholas Trist, an unofficial U.S. representative, started to negotiate a peace 
treaty.74  The U.S. eventually signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on 
February 2, 1848,75 and the Senate provided advice and consent on March 
10, 1848.76   
After the Spanish-American War, the Supreme Court, in Ribas y Hijo v. 
United States, confirmed that a presidential proclamation establishing a truce 
is not a termination of the legal state of war.77  During the Spanish-American 
War—after decisive naval and ground victories by the United States in Cuba 
and the Pacific—Spain signed an armistice on August 12, 1898.78  A peace 
treaty, the Treaty of Paris,79 was signed by Spain and the U.S. on December 
10, 1898,80 with the Senate providing advice and consent in February, 
 
 73.  Dawson, supra note 71, at 93–95; see also RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE 
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: A LEGACY OF CONFLICT 30 (1990). 
 74.  Initially, President Polk sent Nicholas Trist to negotiate the end of the U.S.-Mexican War, 
but Polk eventually recalled Trist.  See GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 73, at 37–39; see also 
Dawson supra note 71, at 98–99.  However, Trist disobeyed the President’s recall order and 
completed the treaty negotiations.  See GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 73, at 37–39.  Polk 
then accepted the substance of the Treaty even though he had previously fired Trist.  See id. 
 75.  Dawson, supra note 71, at 98–99.  Mexico and the U.S. were the parties to the Treaty.  
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, July 4, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922; JOSEPH WHEELAN, INVADING 
MEXICO: AMERICA’S CONTINENTAL DREAM AND THE MEXICAN WAR, 1846–1848 407 (2007); see 
GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, , supra note 73, at 45–46. 
 76.  Dawson, supra note ,71, at 98–99.  The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was provided with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, thirty-four to fourteen on March 10, 1848 with amendments, and it 
was ratified by President Polk on March 16, 1848.  WHEELAN, supra note 75, at 409–11.  The 
Senate-approved version of the treaty did not include Article X, which guaranteed the protection of 
Mexican land grants.  Id.  After the Senate provided advice and consent to the treaty, the treaty 
entered into force in Querétaro, Mexico on May 30, 1848, and peace was proclaimed on, July 4, 
1848.  Id.  The May 30, 1848 agreement included a new three-article protocol, the Querétaro 
Protocol, to explain the amendments that had been added between February and May.  Id, 
 77.  See Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 323 (1904). 
 78.  The last shots of the war were fired off the coast of Cuba on August 14.  COLEMAN 
PHILLIPSON, TERMINATION OF WAR AND TREATIES OF PEACE 70 (1916).  Commercial intercourse 
between Spain and America resumed later in August.  Id. at 71; see also IVAN MUSICANT, EMPIRE 
BY DEFAULT: THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE DAWN OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY 581–82 
(2008).  See generally DAVID F. TRASK, THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1898 445–72 (1996). 
 79.  December 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.  On August 26, the President appointed peace 
commissioners and the delegates met in Paris for the first time on October 1.  PHILLIPSON, supra 
note 78, at 141–43.  Negotiations last until December 10.  30 Stat. 1754. 
 80.  TRASK, supra note 78, at 466. 
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1899.81  The Court found that “state of war did not, in law, cease until the 
ratification” of the Treaty of Paris, notwithstanding the earlier armistice.82  
The Court did not indicate what effect an actual presidential proclamation of 
peace would have on the legal state of war.  Still, Ribas y Hijo is useful in 
showing that the termination of war for constitutional purposes must be done 
purposely; although, it does not address whether the President can terminate 
a war unilaterally. 
Both the Mexican-American and the Spanish-American Wars are 
illustrative of how Congress and the President must work together to 
terminate wars formally, and that peace treaties can provide an appropriate 
balance of authority between the political branches.       
e.  Civil War 
The Civil War was not a war between States, but an insurgent rebellion, 
which was not initiated by formal declaration of war, nor terminated by the 
signing of a peace treaty.83  The Civil War helped establish the general 
principle that although Congress has the power to declare war, war can be 
made by outside actors that require the President to act “without waiting for 
Congress to baptize it with a name.”84  
The Court also created precedent in acknowledging presidential 
proclamation as sufficient to terminate the war, at least for statutory 
interpretation purposes.85  In The Protector, the Court considered a statute of 
limitations question associated with the Judiciary Act of 1789 that turned on 
the termination date of the Civil War, and ruled that it is necessary “to refer 
to some public act of the political departments of the government to fix the 
dates [of war termination].”86  According to The Protector Court, the U.S. 
 
 81.  ROBERT L. BEISNER, TWELVE AGAINST EMPIRE: THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS, 1898–1900 3 
(1968). 
 82.  Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 323 (1904). 
 83.  See Mathews, supra note 11, at 821.  Although the Civil War was not a “war” in the 
constitutional sense described in this Article’s Introduction, a discussion of Supreme Court decisions 
from the Civil War period is included, because they bear important implications for the development 
of judicial precedent concerning the war termination power of Congress and the President. 
 84.  The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668–69 (1862) (“If a war be made by invasion of a 
foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.”). 
 85.  See The Protector, 79 U.S. 700 (1871). 
 86.  Id. at 701–02 (1871); see also United States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. 56, 70 (1869) (Whereas, 
the ratification of a peace treaty would determine the termination of the war between States, “in a 
domestic war . . . some public proclamation or legislation would seem to be required to inform those 
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Civil War ended in different states on different dates based on different 
presidential proclamations.87  Congress recognized the last presidential 
proclamations as marking the end of the rebellion in a statute continuing 
wartime pay for three years after the end of the war.88  In absence of clearer 
standards, the Court relied upon two presidential proclamations to declare 
that the war had concluded.89   
Faced with a similar question nine years later, the Court, in McElrath v. 
United States, determined that the public proclamation of war termination 
would be a joint effort between Congress and the President.90  Though the 
Court in The Protector used the presidential proclamations in lieu of more 
certain criteria,91 Congress subsequently recognized the presidential 
proclamations as marking the end of the rebellion in a statute continuing 
wartime pay for three years after the end of the war.92   
2.  World Wars I and II: The Breakdown of the Model War Termination 
Process 
With the exception of the Civil War, the lion’s share of nineteenth 
century U.S. wars ended with peace treaties.   World War I marked the end 
of this treaty-making practice—which disappeared altogether after the 
creation of the United Nations.  World War II was the last declared war, and 
the complexity of its end in the early stages of the Cold War marked a shift 
in how wars are terminated.  The fact that Congress has not played as 
 
whose private rights were affected by it, of the time when it terminated . . .  it is only necessary to 
notice the proclamation of the President, of August 20th, 1866, and the act of Congress of the 2d of 
March, 1867.”). 
 87.  See The Protector, 79 U.S. at 701–02.  It is worth noting that the Supreme Court used this 
metric in want of an established rule. 
 88.  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 145, § 2, 14 Stat. 422. 
 89.  The Protector, 79 U.S. at 702; see also Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. 1258, 1258–59 (1861) 
(stating “insurrection against the Government of the United States has broken out in the [southern 
states]” and directing a blockade of Southern ports); Proclamation No. 1, 14 Stat. 811, 812–13 
(1866) (“I, Andrew Johnson, . . . declare that the insurrection . . . is at an end [in all states except 
Texas], and is henceforth to be so regarded.”); Proclamation No. 4, 14 Stat. 814, 814–17 (1866) 
(declaring the war also ended in Texas).   
 90.  See McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 438 (1880) (“Since peace, in contemplation of 
law, could not exist while rebellion against the national government remained unsuppressed, the 
close of the rebellion and the complete restoration of the national authority, as announced by the 
President and recognized by Congress, must be accepted as the beginning of the ‘time of peace.’”).   
 91.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
 92.  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 145, § 2, 14 Stat. 422; see also Mathews, supra note 11, at, 821. 
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prominent a role in the termination of wars as it did before the world wars 
has coincided with a significant shift in how the political branches interact 
when wars end.   
a.  World War I 
Congress played an integral role in the termination of World War I; 
peace treaties, however, were not ratified before the political branches 
declared peace.  World War I involved U.S. declarations of war,93 but U.S. 
involvement was terminated through a multi-step process.  Hostilities ended 
after armistice agreements were signed near Compiègne, France, on 
November 11, 1918.94   
Although today sole executive agreements are signed frequently,95 
President Wilson denied having the power to end the war solely through 
presidential proclamation,96 and consequently submitted the Treaty of 
Versailles to the Senate for its advice and consent.97  Despite President 
Wilson’s vigorous advocacy, the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles—
largely because of its unpopular provisions related to the establishment of 
the League of Nations.98  Congress attempted to pass a joint resolution 
ending the war, which was vetoed by Wilson, but was ultimately able to pass 
a joint resolution ending the war at the behest of President Harding;99 the 
 
 93.  The U.S. declared war against Germany by Joint Resolution of Congress on April 6, 1917.  
S.J. Res. 1, 65th Cong., 40 Stat. 1 (1917).  War against Austria-Hungary was declared by Joint 
Resolution of Congress, December 7, 1917.  S.J. Res. 169, 65th Cong., 40 Stat. 429 (1917). 
 94.  HEW STRACHAN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR 325–26 (2003); see Edward A. Coffman, The 
Meuse-Argonne Offensive: The Final Battle of World War I?, in BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: HOW 
AMERICA ENDS ITS WARS 179, 190 (Matthew Moten ed., 2011). 
 95.  The United States concluded ten times as many executive agreements as treaties in the 
1990s.  Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1287 (“The average number of treaties concluded each year has 
grown from slightly over one per year during the first fifty years of the republic to about twenty-five 
per year during the 1990s.  Executive agreements, on the other hand have gone from one on average 
every two years during the first fifty years of the republic to well over three hundred per year.”)   
 96.  58 CONG. REC. 4434–35 (Aug. 22, 1919) (statement of President Wilson) (“I feel 
constrained to say . . . not only that in my judgment I have not the power by proclamation to declare 
that peace exists, but that I could in no circumstances consent to take such a course prior to the 
ratification of a formal treaty of peace.”). 
 97.  Manley O. Hudson, The Duration of the War Between the United States and Germany, 39 
HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1031–32 (1926). 
 98.  See generally, JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., BREAKING THE HEART OF THE WORLD: 
WOODROW WILSON AND THE FIGHT FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (2001). 
 99.  A Joint Resolution of Congress terminated the wars between Germany and the U.S., and 
Austria-Hungary and the U.S. on July 2, 1921.  See Act of July 2, 1921, ch. 40, 42 Stat. 105.  
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resolution was followed by treaties regularizing relations and establishing 
peace with the Central Powers100 and a presidential proclamation101 declaring 
that the war had ended on the date of the second congressional resolution.102  
After the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, a series of 
joint resolutions, treaties normalizing relations, and a presidential 
proclamation ended U.S. involvement in World War I.103  Although 
congressional resolutions purported to end the war, they came at the 
President’s behest and were accompanied by treaties.  Consequently, they 
affirm the President’s role in the termination of war even in the absence of a 
formal peace treaty.  
The Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in the face of 
presidential support reflects the important role of both the executive and 
legislative branches in terminating World War I.104  Notably, both political 
 
 100.  The Treaty on Establishment of Friendly Relations with Germany (“Treaty of Berlin”) was 
ratified by the U.S. on October 21, 1921, and by Germany on November 2, 1921.  See Treaty of 
Peace Between the United States and Germany, U.S.-Ger., Aug. 25, 1921, 42 Stat. 1939; Treaty of 
Peace Between the United States and Austria, U.S.-Austria, Aug. 24, 1921, 42 Stat. 1946; see also 
Treaty of Peace Between United States and Hungary, U.S.-Hung., Aug. 29, 1921, 42 Stat. 1951.  
Ratification instruments were exchanged in Berlin on November 11, 1921.  See Treaty of Peace 
Between the United States and Germany, U.S.-Ger., Aug. 25, 1921, 42 Stat. 1939; Treaty of Peace 
Between the United States and Austria, U.S.-Austria, Aug. 24, 1921, 42 Stat. 1946; see also Treaty 
of Peace Between United States and Hungary, U.S.-Hung., Aug. 29, 1921, 42 Stat. 1951. 
 101.  Presidential Proclamation Declaring Peace with Germany, 42 Stat. 1944. 
 102.  See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93D CONG., CONGRESS AND THE TERMINATION OF THE 
VIETNAM WAR 2 (Comm. Print 1973) (“[A]ction by Congress to terminate a war . . . can become the 
instrument by which the war is officially ended by the United States from the standpoint of its own 
position with respect to a state of war . . . .  After the failure of the Treaty of Versailles it was 
Congress which brought the war officially to an end, . . . by first enacting a joint resolution 
terminating the war from the domestic legal standpoint, and then enacting a second joint resolution 
terminating it from the standpoint of U.S. belligerency. . . .  To obviate all uncertainty, the President, 
after Congress acted, negotiated treaties [not peace treaties] which, in substance, gave effect to what 
Congress had done.”).  It is worth noting that the congressional resolutions came at the request of 
President Harding, as President Wilson had vetoed a previous resolution attempting to end the war, 
and that after the President had conducted the treaties, he issued a presidential proclamation adopting 
the date of the second Congressional resolution as the end of the war.  See id. at 4. 
 103.  See notes 99–102. 
 104.  A number of provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, which was rejected by the Senate, were 
incorporated into the Treaty of Berlin.  See Hudson, supra note 97, at 1031; Mosier, supra note 52, 
at 1618.  The Treaty of Berlin was the second attempt to end World War I by treaty.  See Hudson, 
supra note 97, at 1031; Mosier, supra note 52, at 1618.  The Treaty of Versailles was defeated in the 
Senate on March 19, 1920.  See Hudson, supra note 97, at 1031; Mosier, supra note 52, at 1618.  
The Senate did not approve the Treaty of Versailles largely because of the controversial Article Ten, 
which dealt with the newly created League of Nations.  See Hudson, supra note 97, at 1031; Mosier, 
supra note 52, at 1618.  Although the Treaty of Berlin did not include a provision regarding the 
League of Nations, it stated that the U.S. would enjoy all “rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations 
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branches adopted the date of the congressional resolution as the end of the 
war—rather than the ratification of the final treaty on November 11, 
1921105—and President Harding both requested and ratified, post hoc, the 
congressional peace resolutions.106  World War I does not furnish an 
example of a unilateral peace declaration by Congress, but it marks a 
significant departure from prior historical practice.   
The unusual circumstances surrounding the ratification debate over the 
Treaty of Versailles made it difficult for the Supreme Court to determine 
when the state of war had terminated.  In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries 
& Warehouse Co., the Supreme Court considered whether the phrase 
“conclusion of the present war,” as used in the War-time Prohibition Act, 
prohibited the distribution and sale of whiskey in 1919.107  When the 
Hamilton Court heard oral argument—one day after the Senate declined to 
ratify the Treaty of Versailles—it did not appear that a formal peace treaty 
was on the horizon.108  Rather than examine the constitutional issues at stake 
in the case, the Court chose to frame the decision as one of statutory 
interpretation.109  The Court found that the Act itself was an appropriate use 
 
or advantages” conferred to it by the Treaty of Versailles.  See Hudson, supra note 97, at 1035; 
Mosier, supra note 52, at 1618.  See generally COOPER, supra note 98; Coffman, supra note 94. 
 105.  One scholar noted: 
It would seem not improper to set July 14, 1919, as the date of the end of the war for 
purposes of trading between nationals of the two countries; to set March 3, 1921, as the 
date of the end of the war for the purpose of applying much of America’s wartime 
legislation; and to set July 2, 1921, as the date of the end of the war for purposes of 
American municipal law and claims before the Mixed Claims Commission.  But there 
may also be some international situations in which it would be improper to say that the 
war ended before November 11, 1921.  
Hudson, supra note 97, at 1045. 
 106.  See id. at 1035. 
 107.  251 U.S. 146, 153, 160–61 (1919). 
 108.  See generally Hamilton, 251 U.S. 146. 
 109.  See generally id.  The Court chose to analyze similar wartime federal statutes with 
termination provisions contingent upon ratification of a treaty of peace or presidential proclamation 
either of the exchange of treaty instruments or of termination of the existing state of war.  See id. at 
165 n.12 (“‘Within one year from the signing of a treaty of peace with the Imperial German 
Government.’  ‘That this act shall remain in force during the continuance shall cease six months 
after . . . the termination of the war by the proclamation of the treaty of peace.’ . . . ‘All power and 
authority shall cease upon the proclamation of the final treaty of peace between the United States 
and the Imperial German Government.’ . . . ‘That the provisions of this act shall cease to be in effect 
when the existing state of war between the United States and Germany shall have terminated, and 
the fact and date of such termination shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the President.’  ‘The 
words “end of the war,” as used herein, shall be deemed to mean the date of proclamation of 
exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace, unless the President shall, by proclamation, declare a 
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of congressional authority under the war powers clause110—that it did not 
depend on “the existence of a technical state of war, terminable only with 
the ratification of a treaty of peace or a proclamation of peace.”111   
Some commentators have suggested that Hamilton confirms that wars 
must be terminated either by the President or a combination of the President 
and Congress through treaty signing and ratification.112  A closer reading of 
the case, however, suggests that Hamilton merely concerned the statutory 
construction of the phrase “‘conclusion of the war,’” and does not bear 
directly on the issue of constitutional war termination powers.113  Indeed, the 
Hamilton Court devoted only one sentence to the constitutional requirement 
for formal termination of war that was not essential to its statutory 
holding.114  At a minimum, that opinion was the first time the Court 
suggested—at least for the purpose of the statute in question—that a 
presidential proclamation was sufficient to terminate a war.  After Hamilton, 
various federal court decisions reiterated that the legal state of war could end 
through either a presidential proclamation of peace or ratification of a peace 
treaty.115 
 
prior date, in which case the date so proclaimed shall be deemed to be the “end of the war” within 
the meaning of this act.’” (citations omitted)). 
 110.  Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 160–61. 
 111.  Id. at 161 (citations omitted) (“Assuming that the implied power to enact such a prohibition 
must depend, not upon the existence of a technical state of war, terminable only with the ratification 
of a treaty of peace or a proclamation of peace, but upon some actual emergency or necessity arising 
out of the war or incident to it, still, as was said in Stewart v. Kahn, [78 U.S. 493 (1870)], ‘The 
power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the insurgent forces.  It carries with 
it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the 
evils which have arisen from its rise and progress.’” (citations omitted)). 
 112.  See, e.g., Mosier, supra note 52, at 1619–20, 1622–23 (“Congress can determine when a 
statute expires; the usual political agencies, the President or the President and Senate, can end war 
through presidential proclamation or peace treaty, respectively.”); see also Mathews, supra note 11, 
at 822–23 (stating that the wartime statutes indicate that Congress believed WWI could be legally 
terminated both by presidential proclamation or by a peace treaty). 
 113.  See Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 167 (“Congress . . . provided that the time when the act ceased to 
be operative should be fixed by the President’s ascertaining and proclaiming the date when 
demobilization had terminated.”). 
 114.  See id.; see also Hudson, supra note 97, at 1045 (distinguishing the termination provisions 
of wartime legislation from the termination of the legal state of war). 
 115.  See, e.g., Citizens Protective League v. Byrnes, 64 F. Supp. 233, 234 (D.D.C. 1946) (“[T]he 
period of war has been held to extend to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace or the Proclamation of 
Peace.”); The Elqui, 62 F. Supp. 764, 767 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) (recognizing that the state of war ends 
upon “the formal signing of a peace treaty or a proclamation by the sovereign that the war has been 
officially recognized as being at an end.”); Miller v. Rouse, 276 F. 715, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) 
(denying a claim because it was made “three days after the declaration of peace as now promulgated 
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Nonetheless, this Article contends that Congress has a significant 
constitutional role to play in the war termination process.116 
In Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Miller, the Court considered 
whether the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, could be 
enforced following the cessation of hostilities, given that the Act was an 
emergency wartime provision.117  The Court responded “that the power 
which declared the necessity is the power to declare its cessation, and what 
the cessation requires.  The power is legislative.”118  The unattributed 
pronoun in this statement should be read to address Congress’s power to 
determine how long the Act should remain in effect based on whether the 
“emergency of war” had passed.119  It does not directly address a 
congressional power to declare peace.120  Instead, the statute stated that the 
 
by the President’s recent proclamation”).  See generally, Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 
138, 140 (1948) (“The District Court was of the view that the authority of Congress to regulate rents 
by virtue of the war power ended with the Presidential Proclamation terminating hostilities on 
December 31, 1946, since that proclamation inaugurated ‘peace-in-fact’ though it did not mark 
termination of the war.” (citations omitted) (footnote omitted)); id. at 140 n.3 (noting that the 
presidential proclamation did not terminate Congress’ war powers because the proclamation 
recognized the end of hostilities but noted that “‘a state of war still exists’”  (citations omitted)).  In 
United States v. Hicks, the district court examined the same question of statutory interpretation posed 
in Hamilton, and concluded that although a ratified treaty of peace is the best evidence of the 
termination of a war, a presidential proclamation supported by evidence that hostilities have ceased 
is a sufficient alternative.  256 F. 707, 710–14 (W.D. Ky. 1919) (“The authoritative publications 
show that, while war is usually terminated by a treaty of peace, and that such treaty is the best 
evidence of such termination, history shows many instances in which wars were terminated without 
any treaty at all. . . . [A] completely ratified treaty of peace is the best evidence of the termination of 
a war; but as we have said such a treaty is not essential to the actual ending of a war, as have many 
times been demonstrated.  Indeed, there is no formal or ceremonious way agreed upon in 
international law or otherwise for ending a war. . . . [T]he statement of the President, officially made 
and acclaimed on the 11th of that month, and which met with quite universal acceptance by the 
people, is as effective in showing the fact of the actual termination of real war as would be the case 
with a treaty.”). 
 116.  See infra Part IV. 
 117.  See Commercial Trust Co. of N.J. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) (“The next contention of 
the Trust Company is that, the act being a provision for the emergency of war, it ceased with the 
cessation of war, ceased with the joint resolution of Congress declaring the state of war between 
Germany and the United States at an end, and its approval by the President, July 2, 1921, and the 
Proclamation of Peace by the President August 25, 1921.”). 
 118.  Id. at 57.   
 119.  See generally id. 
 120.  See id. (“A court cannot estimate the effects of a great war and pronounce their termination 
at a particular moment of time, and that its consequences are so far swallowed up that legislation 
addressed to its emergency had ceased to have purpose or operation with the cessation of the 
conflicts in the field.  Many problems would yet remain for consideration and solution, and such was 
the judgment of Congress, for it reserved from its legislation the Trading with the Enemy Act and 
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phrase “end of the war,” which was defined as the date the treaty ratification 
was concluded or an earlier date when the President proclaimed the war to 
have ended, only applied to the construction of the act.121 
b.  World War II 
World War II marked the end of the traditional war termination 
paradigm and a shift to ending war by presidential proclamation of peace 
without a peace treaty.  Although the conflict was more in line with 
nineteenth century wars in terms of interbranch cooperation, it had some 
differences.  The termination of World War II is more complex than 
previous wars because of the number of foreign states that were at war with 
the United States.  As a result, there were multiple war terminations.   
The U.S. entered World War II after Japan attacked the U.S. Naval Base 
at Pearl Harbor in 1941.122  World War II involved separate U.S. declarations 
of war against Japan, Germany, Italy, Romania, and Hungary.123  Germany 
surrendered in May of 1945, after Berlin fell,124 and Japan surrendered in 
August of 1945,125 in the wake of successful military operations on Iwo Jima 
 
amendments thereto, and provided that all property subject to that act shall be retained by the United 
States ‘until such time as the Imperial German government shall have made suitable provision for 
the satisfaction of all claims.’” (citations omitted)). 
 121.  Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411. 
 122.  See generally WILLIAMSON MURRAY & ALLAN R. MILLETT, A WAR TO BE WON: FIGHTING 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2001); R. J. OVERY, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (3d ed. 
2008); GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II 
(2005).  The U.S. declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941.  Joint Resolution of Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 
561, 55 Stat. 795.  The U.S. declared war on Germany on December 11, 1941.  Joint Resolution of 
Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 564, 55 Stat. 796.  The U.S. declared war with Italy on December 11.  Joint 
Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 565, 55 Stat. 797.  The U.S. declared war on Bulgaria, Hungary, 
and Rumania on June 5, 1942.  Joint Resolution of June 5, 1942, ch. 323–25, 56 Stat. 307.   
 123.  See supra note 122. 
 124.  See B. H. LIDDELL HART, HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 680 (First Am. ed. 1971).  
Fighting ended on the Italian front on May 2, 1945, and a surrender document was signed three days 
prior.  Id.  The German signed another surrender on May 4, and signed a more conclusive surrender 
that applied to all German soldiers in a more elaborate ceremony on May 7.  Id.  See generally JOHN 
TOLAND, THE LAST 100 DAYS: THE TUMULTUOUS AND CONTROVERSIAL STORY OF THE FINAL 
DAYS OF WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE (Modern Libr. Paperback ed. 2003).  Eisenhower announced 
the end of the war in Europe on May 7.  Theodore A. Wilson, Gotterdammerung: War’s End in 
Europe, 1945, in BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: HOW AMERICA ENDS ITS WARS 213 (Matthew Moten, 
ed., 2011). 
 125.  See LIDDELL HART, supra note 124, at 698.  Japan formally surrendered on September 2, 
1945, on the U.S.S. Missouri.  Id.  The Emperor of Japan had actually announced Japan’s surrender 
on August 14, 1945, after the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima.  Id.  President Truman declared the 
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and Okinawa, and the deployment of nuclear weapons by the U.S. against 
Japan.126   
Even though both Germany and Japan surrendered in 1945, President 
Truman did not proclaim the cessation of hostilities until December 31, 
1946, and even then noted that “a state of war still exists.”127  It was not until 
July 1951 that “Truman called for an end to this state of war.”128  On June 5, 
1947,129 the Senate passed a resolution to ratify the Paris Peace Conference 
treaties with Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Italy.130  No formal peace 
treaty was signed with Germany131 at the conclusion of World War II;132 
although, in 1990 the U.S., France, the USSR, Britain, and Germany signed 
a final agreement on the status of Germany that resulted in German re-
unification.133  Instead of a peace treaty, the President issued a declaration 
 
cessation of hostilities by a presidential proclamation on December 31, 1946.  BARBARA SALAZAR 
TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21405, U.S. PERIODS OF WAR AND DATES OF CURRENT 
CONFLICTS 3 (2012).  The war was also terminated by the Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, 
signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951 (“Treaty of San Francisco”).  See Treaty of Peace 
with Japan, U.S.-Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169.  The peace treaty with Japan was ratified on 
March 20, 1952, and became effective on April 28, 1952.  TORREON, at 3. 
 126.  LIDDELL HART, supra note 124, at 698; Gerhard L. Weinberg, The End of the Pacific War in 
World War II, in BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: HOW AMERICA ENDS ITS WARS 220, 223–31 
(Matthew Moten, ed., 2011). 
 127.  See Proclamation 2714: Cessation of Hostilities of World War II, 1946 PUB. PAPERS 514 
(Dec. 31, 1946); President Harry S Truman, President’s Proclamation, N.Y. TIMES, January 1, 1947, 
at 1; Letter to the President of the Senate Recommending Legislation to Terminate the State of War 
with Germany, 1951 PUB. PAPERS 378 (July 9, 1951). 
 128.  Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1685 (2010). 
 129.  The President proclaimed the cessation of hostilities between the U.S. and Italy, Hungary, 
and Bulgaria on December 31, 1946.  TORREON, supra note 125, at 4.  The parties agreed to the 
terms of war termination at the Paris Peace Conference, on February 10, 1947, and it became 
effective September 15, 1947.  Id. 
 130.  Treaty of Peace with Italy, U.S.-It., Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245; Treaty of Peace with 
Roumania, U.S.-Rom., Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1757; Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, U.S.-Bulg., Feb. 
10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1915; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, , U.S.-Hung., Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 2065. 
See generally TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 (2006). 
 131.  “German representative Colonel General Alfred Jodl signed the unconditional act of 
surrender to Allied representatives in . . . Reims, France . . . on May 7, 1945.”  TORREON, supra note 
125, at 3.  “A second German surrender ceremony was held on May 8 in Berlin at the insistence of 
the U.S.S.R.”  Id.  The “presidential proclamation of December 31, 1946” declared the end of 
hostilities.  Id.  Congress passed a joint resolution ending the war on October 19, 1951, and the 
President followed with a proclamation on October 24, 1951.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 132.  TORREON, supra note 125, at 3. 
 133.  The Treaty was signed on September 12, 1990; the Senate gave its advice and consent on 
October 10, 1990; and the treaty went into force on March 15, 1991.  Treaty on the Final Settlement 
with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 1696 U.N.T.S. 115. 
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that the war with Germany had ended in 1945,134 following a congressional 
joint resolution.135  A formal peace treaty was signed with Japan in 1951.136  
World War II eventually involved formal peace treaties as World War I did, 
but it also had presidential proclamations that declared a cessation of 
hostilities. 
In 1948, the Court, in Ludecke v. Watkins, held that the legal state of 
war is terminated not merely by a cessation of hostilities, but by a political 
act.137  The relevant issue addressed by the Court was whether the provisions 
of the Alien Enemy Act of 1789 had expired, which depended on whether 
the “‘declared war’” referenced in the statute had ended.138  Drawing on 
historical observations, the Court ruled that the state of war can be 
terminated by a peace treaty, congressional legislation that declares an end 
to the state of war, or a presidential proclamation that the war has ended.139  
 
 134.  Proclamation 2950: Termination of the State of War with Germany, 1951 PUB. PAPERS 598 
(October 24, 1951).   
 135.  Act of Oct. 19, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-181, 65 Stat. 451. 
 136.  See Weinberg, supra note 157, at 232. 
 137.  See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166–67 (1948); see also Dudziak, supra note 128, at 
1685.  Compare the Supreme Court’s holding with United States v. Hicks, 256 F. 707, 711–12 
(W.D. Ky. 1919), which treated President Wilson’s statement that the “war” had “ended” subsequent 
to the armistice with Germany as evidence that wartime statutory authorization had ended.  Though 
the district court treated that statement as a presidential proclamation for the purposes of statutory 
construction, subsequent events—such as congressional declarations ending U.S. belligerency, 
treaties normalizing relations with Germany, and President Harding’s proclamation that the war had 
ended (not to mention the circus around the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles)—belie any 
notion that the ending of hostilities in World War I signified the end of the legal state of war.  See id. 
 138.  Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 166, n.11. 
 139.  See id. at 168–69; see also id. at 169 n.13 (“Congress can, of course, provide either by a day 
certain or a defined event for the expiration of a statute.  But when the life of a statute is defined by 
the existence of a war, Congress leaves the determination of when a war is concluded to the usual 
political agencies of the Government.”).  This is not to suggest that a congressional joint resolution 
can, of its own force, legally terminate a state of war.  See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93D 
CONG., CONGRESS AND THE TERMINATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR 10–11 (Comm. Print 1973) 
(observing that there is no precedent for Congress ending an undeclared war by joint resolution, and 
conceding that though a presidential proclamation combined with such a resolution might suffice to 
end U.S. belligerency from an international perspective and it might end wartime congressional 
delegations of domestic authority to the President, a unilateral resolution would not prevent the 
President from carrying out hostilities).  The analysis in this report is complex: it acknowledges a 
difference between the war power, domestic wartime grants of power, and the international status of 
war.  During World War I, different treaties, congressional resolutions, and presidential 
proclamations addressed each of these issues separately.  See also Mosier, supra note 52, at 1622–23 
(“The [Ludecke] Court’s footnote to the statement ‘“the state of war” may be terminated by treaty or 
legislation or Presidential proclamation’ also suggests that the Court was listing the methods by 
which the statute, not the war, could be terminated.  Congress, according to the Court, could 
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Clarifying that by “state of war” it was referring to the end-life of the statute 
and that it was not reaching the question of whether Congress has the 
constitutional authority to declare peace, the Court ruled the statute was 
applicable even though hostilities had ended in World War II because the 
U.S. was still in a state of war.140  
3.  Post-World War II to the Present: War in the Age of the United 
Nations 
Post-World War II wars involving the United States are remarkably 
consistent in their lack of a formal declaration by Congress, the 
predominance of presidential control, and the haze around when they are 
terminated.141  With the increase in smaller conflicts that defy clear 
categorization as war (such as in Bosnia and Kosovo) Congress has 
occasionally relied on its power of the purse to control the direction and end 
of hostilities.142  Generally, however, Congress has authorized the use of 
force without a formal declaration of war and allowed the President to 
terminate the war unilaterally.143   
Because the U.N .Charter generally prohibits states from engaging in the 
non-consensual use of force on the territory of another state,144 some scholars 
believe that “modern international law has largely eliminated th[e] historic 
function for declarations of war.”145  Actual declarations of war are arguably 
 
‘provide either by a day certain or a defined event for the expiration of a statute.  But when the life 
of a statute is defined by the existence of a war, Congress leaves the determination of when a war is 
concluded to the usual political agencies of the Government.’  Congress can determine when a 
statute expires; the usual political agencies, the President or the President and Senate, can end war 
through presidential proclamation or peace treaty, respectively.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 140.  See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 168–69, n.13. 
 141.  See generally William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare 
War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 702–04 (1997). 
 142.  See Michael J. Glennon, Publish and Perish: Congress’s Effort to Snip SNEPP (Before and 
AFSA), 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 163, 173 (1989). 
 143.  Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declaration of War, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 89, 123 (2008). 
 144.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”). 
 145.  CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 220 (3d ed. 2009); Robert F. Turner, The War on Terrorism and the Modern Relevance 
of the Constitutional Power to “Declare War,” 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 531 (2002) 
(adding that “no sovereign state has clearly issued a declaration of war in more than half a century”). 
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useless because “[w]ar has disappeared from international law.”146  Thus, 
although Congress has not formally declared war since World War II, it has 
authorized the use of force on several occasions to provide the appropriate 
domestic authority to the President.147   
Even if the U.N. Charter could account for the change in how war is 
initiated, it does not completely explain why treaties are no longer the 
method of terminating war.  One might argue that when there is no formal 
declaration of war there cannot be a formal declaration of peace through a 
treaty.  However, the peace treaty after the undeclared Quasi-War with 
France is clear precedent for allowing termination of any war by treaty.148  
Perhaps the President does not negotiate peace treaties with senatorial advice 
and consent, because of a general preference to use executive agreements to 
make international law developed in recent decades.149   
Notwithstanding post-U.N. Charter executive and legislative branch 
practices, as well as the exceptional example of the Quasi-War with France, 
this Article contends that adhering to such unilateral war termination 
practices generates friction with the principle of the separation of powers; 
the Framers’ vision of a divided treaty-making power; and the values of 
democracy, transparency, and accountability that they preserve.150  
a.  Vietnam and Related Southeast Asian Wars 
Like the Quasi-War with France, the Vietnam War was authorized by a 
congressional resolution that stopped short of declaring war.151  As the war 
grew unpopular, Congress placed multiple restrictions on military operations 
 
 146.  Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 11, 17 (2000).  But 
see Prakash, supra note 143, at 108–16 (noting the many other reasons for declaring war, including 
placing the foreign state on notice, as well as activating war-time domestic law).  Whether 
congressional authorizations for the use of force establish a “state of war” under international law is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 147.  Such authorizations also serve the other original functions of a formal declaration of war, 
leading Saikrishna Prakash to argue that such authorizations are actually declarations of war.  See 
Prakash, supra note 143, at 137–38. 
 148.  See Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1479, 1618 n.695 
(2006). 
 149.  See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 
119 YALE L.J. 140, 149–50 (2009). 
 150.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 151.  See Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964); Treanor, supra note 
141, at 702–03. 
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in Vietnam.152  In 1967, Congress passed a “Congressional Statement of 
Policy,” calling on the President to reach a negotiated settlement in 
Vietnam.153  In 1971, Congress considered passing the Cooper Church 
Amendment, which would have banned the use of ground troops in 
Cambodia.154  Additionally, the Mansfield Amendment of 1971 declared that 
the United States was to withdraw from Vietnam “at the earliest practicable 
date.”155  Through a series of appropriations bills, in 1973 Congress banned 
all combat activities in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.156  Two months after 
the Secretary of State signed a cease-fire agreement,157 the U.S. removed all 
combat troops from Vietnam.158  The Vietnam War ended with neither a 
peace treaty nor a direct presidential proclamation.  
Foreign relations scholars disagree on whether the congressional 
amendments terminated authorization for the war.159  Congress also repealed 
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that authorized the War in Vietnam in 1970, 
 
 152.  The Nixon Administration never challenged the constitutional power of Congress to cut off 
funds for the war in court.  Glennon, supra note 142, at 173.  It is notable, however, that Congress 
repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.  See Foreign Military Sales Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 
91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055 (1971) (“The joint resolution entitled ‘Joint resolution to promote 
the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia’, approved August 10, 1964 
(78 Stat. 384; Public Law 88-408), is terminated effective upon the day that the second session of the 
Ninety-first Congress is last adjourned.”).   
 153.  22 U.S.C. § 2301 (2012). 
 154.  Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-652, § 401, 85 Stat. 348, 360; 
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 52 (1990).   
 155.  Mansfield Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-156, § 601, 85 Stat. 423 (1971).  It is notable that 
Congress continued to appropriate money for operations in Vietnam even though these amendments 
were passed.  BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 145, at 256. 
 156.  Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-126, § 13, 87 Stat. 
451 (1973); Continuing Appropriations, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-124 § 1, 87 Stat. 449 (1973); 
Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 130 (1973); 
Fulbright Amendment to Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 
307, 87 Stat. 99. 
 157.  See Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, U.S.-Viet., Jan. 27, 
1973, 24 U.S.T. 1. 
 158.  Interestingly, Vietnam era veteran benefits continued until May 1975.  See Gerald R. Ford, 
Statement on Terminating the Eligibility Period for Vietnam Era Veterans Benefits, AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 7, 1975), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4901. 
 159.  Compare FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE 
WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 231 (1989) (stating that these appropriations 
conditions repealed authorization), with JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 32–34 (1993) (stating appropriations 
conditions did not deauthorize the Vietnam War). 
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but even this did not bar the President from continuing operations in 
Vietnam.160  Part of the reason why the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution did not end the war was that Congress continued to authorize the 
draft and finance parts of the war.161  Even prior to repeal, congressional 
studies admitted that simply repealing the resolution would not prevent the 
President from resuming hostilities provided that appropriations for the war 
continued.162  Some scholars have taken the view that continued 
appropriations made with full knowledge of the ongoing operations in 
Vietnam constituted ratification of the war, even though the original 
authorization provided by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was repealed.163  
However, they emphasize that such ratification depends on knowledge; thus, 
the secret bombing campaigns against Cambodia in 1970 were not 
authorized simply by virtue of continued appropriations.164 
Following the Vietnam War, Congress attempted to limit presidential 
authority to act militarily overseas through the use of appropriations 
restrictions.165  The Boland amendments limited the availability of 
appropriations money to aid the anti-communist Contras in Nicaragua.166  
The first amendment Congress passed in 1982 attempted to bar the use of all 
appropriations funds to help any group overthrow the Nicaraguan 
government, but this amendment’s ban was not complete.167  In November 
1983, Congress passed a second Boland amendment that limited funding of 
the Contras to $24 million for 1984.168  In October 1984, Congress passed a 
 
 160.  See supra note 152 (discussing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution).  Certain scholars believe the 
President did not have the authority to continue the war in Vietnam after this repeal.  See generally 
William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for 
Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1972).  Ely argues the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution did not 
repeal authorization for the war, in part because Congress took other actions including extending the 
draft and providing funds for some activities in Vietnam.  ELY, supra note 159, at 33–34. 
 161.  See supra note 160. 
 162.  See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93D CONG., CONGRESS AND THE TERMINATION OF THE 
VIETNAM WAR 11 (Comm. Print 1973). 
 163.  See, e.g., WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND 
THE POWER OF THE PURSE 121 (1994). 
 164.  See id. at 121–22. 
 165.  See Louis Fisher, Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 107, 111 (1997). 
 166.  See id. at 111, 117–18. 
 167.  See Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 
1830, 1865 (1982); Fisher, supra note 165, at 117. 
 168.  See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 
1473, 1475 (1983); Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
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third Boland amendment, which was attached to a continuing resolution, and 
again barred the use of appropriations for aid to the Contras.169  A fourth 
Boland amendment attached to the Fiscal Year 1985 Defense Appropriations 
bill subsequently banned sending funds to the Contras through February 28, 
1985.170  Eventually, funding for the Contras was renewed in August 1985.171  
Although there was no formal legal challenge to the Boland amendments, 
the National Security Council securing funding from other countries for the 
Contras was later called the Iran-Contra scandal.172   
The constitutionality of the conditions in appropriations bills has very 
rarely been addressed by courts.  For instance, a district court upheld the ban 
on military operations in Cambodia, but the Second Circuit overturned this 
holding and ruled the validity of the appropriations condition was a non-
justiciable political question.173 
b.  Contemporary Wars: Iraq (1991 and 2003) and Afghanistan  
Recent wars involving major and sustained operations have been 
explicitly authorized by Congress (without formal declarations of war), but 
congressional involvement in war termination activities—such as the 
withdrawal of forces—has been quite limited.  After the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait on November 29, 1990, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 
678, which authorized Member States to use force to liberate Kuwait from 
 
212, § 775, 97 Stat. 1421, 1452 (1983); see also Andrew W. Hayes, The Boland Amendments and 
Foreign Affairs Deference, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1567 (1988). 
 169.  See Temporary Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-441, § 106(c), 98 Stat. 1699, 
1700–01 (1984); see also Hayes, supra note 168, at 1568. 
 170.  See Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 
8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935–36 (1984); see also Hayes, supra note 168, at 1568. 
 171.  See Hayes, supra note 168, at 1568, at 1568. 
 172.  KOH, supra note 154, at 52. 
 173.  See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309–12 (2d Cir. 1973) (“‘As the 
constitutional propriety of the means by which the Executive and the Legislative branches engaged 
in mutual participation in prosecuting the military operations in Southeast Asia, is, as we held in 
Orlando, a political question, so the constitutional propriety of the method and means by which they 
mutually participate in winding down the conflict and in disengaging the nation from it, is also a 
political question and outside of the power and competency of the judiciary.’” (quoting DaCosta v. 
Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971)).  For cases where the legality of the Vietnam War was 
challenged, and it was ruled the plaintiff lacked standing, see Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th 
Cir. 1972); Pietsch v. President of U.S., 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970); Kalish v. United States, 411 
F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Battaglia, 410 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1969); Ashton v. United 
States, 404 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1968); Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Meyers v. 
Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968). 
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Iraqi control.174  The President sought and received congressional approval 
for the 1991 Iraq War;175 Congress also passed a Joint Resolution title 
“Authorizing the Use of Military Force in Iraq.”176  The AUMF for the 1991 
Iraq War limited the purpose of the war to the expulsion of Iraq from 
Kuwait, as opposed to a full invasion of Iraq to overthrow the Hussein 
regime.177  President George H.W. Bush declared an end to hostilities on 
February 28, 1991, in the wake of the highly successful American military 
campaign.178  U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 called for a ceasefire 
and the establishment of a demilitarized zone in Iraq.179  One of Saddam 
Hussein’s generals signed a ceasefire and surrender at Safwan Airfield on 
March 3, 1991.180  At no point was Congress involved in establishing peace. 
The 2003 War in Iraq followed a similar trajectory.  Operation Iraqi 
Freedom was expressly authorized by Congress pursuant to the AUMF 
against Iraq.181  Hostilities commenced on March 20, 2003.182  U.S. and 
coalition forces occupied Iraq from 2003 until the June 2004 transition of 
control from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the autonomous Iraqi 
government.183  U.S. and coalition forces continued to engage in major 
 
 174.  See S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
 175.  Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 
105 Stat. 3 (1991).  
 176.  Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 
105 Stat. 3.  Congress passed the Joint Resolution on January 12, 1991, and President George H.W. 
Bush signed the Joint Resolution on January 14, 1991.  Id.  In addition, “funding for the first Persian 
Gulf War was provided in the form of supplemental appropriations of $42 billion.”  See H.RES. 
159 (1999), H. Rept. 106-127 (1999).  See Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3; see also STEPHEN 
DAGGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22455, MILITARY OPERATIONS: PRECEDENTS FOR FUNDING 
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN REGULAR OR IN SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILLS 6 (2006).  
 177.  Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 
105 Stat. 3. 
 178.  See Andrew J. Bacevich, The United States in Iraq: Terminating an Interminable War, in 
BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: HOW AMERICA ENDS ITS WARS 302, 304–06 (Matthew Moten, ed., 
2011).  Iraq officially accepted the cease-fire terms on April 6, 1991 and the cease-fire took effect 
April 11, 1991.  U.N. Doc. S/22485 (Apr. 11, 1991).  In May of 1991, U.S. forces engaged in 
operations in northern Iraq for emergency relief purposes.  Bacevich at 304–06. 
 179.  S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991). 
 180.  GEORGE H.W. BUSH & BRENT SCOWCROFT, A WORLD TRANSFORMED (NEW YORK: 
ALFRED A. KNOPF) 486-490 (1998). 
 181.  See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. 
 182.  THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 116 (2006). 
 183.  U.S. Hands Back Power in Iraq, BBC NEWS (June 28, 2994), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3845517.stm; see JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., OCCUPYING IRAQ: A 
HISTORY OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY iii (2009). 
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hostilities in Iraq until August 31, 2010, when President Obama announced 
the end of the U.S. combat mission in Iraq.184  U.S. and some coalition forces 
remained in Iraq to support counterterrorism missions and protect U.S. 
civilians until December 2011.185  
In an effort to keep Congress informed of developments during the final 
chapter of the Iraq War, the executive branch delivered several briefings to 
members and staff of relevant congressional committees.186  Yet Congress 
did not play a significant role in the formal termination of the war.187 
 
 184.  See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation 
of the End of Combat Operations in Iraq (Aug. 31, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-
combat-operations-iraq)  Previously, on May 1, 2003, President Bush had declared that “[m]ajor 
combat operations in Iraq have ended.”  George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address to the 
Nation on Iraq from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln (May 1, 2003) (transcript available at 39 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC 491, 516-18 (2003)). 
 185.  Joseph Logan, Last U.S. Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2011, 3:25 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/18/us-iraq-withdrawal-idUSTRE7BH03320111218. 
 186.  Select congressional briefings include: Status of Forces Agreements briefing of House 
Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees, closed sess., Aug. 1, 2008; House Armed Services 
Comm. & House Foreign Affairs Comm., Closed Session Briefing on Status of Forces Agreements 
(2008); Letter from Jeffrey Bergner, Assistant Sec’y Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State to Gary 
Ackerman, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Middle East and South Asia, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives (Mar. 4, 2008) (direct correspondence in answer to question); Negotiating 
a Long-Term Relationship with Iraq: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th 
Cong. (2008); International Relations Budget for Fiscal Year 2009: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008); The November 26 Declaration of Principles: Implications 
for UN Resolutions on Iraq and for Congressional Oversight: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Int’l Orgs., Human Rights and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008); 
Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Budget Request from the Department of Defense: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 110th Cong. (2008); Status of Forces Agreements and UN 
Mandates: What Authorities and Protections Do They Provide to U.S. Personnel?: Hearing Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Human Rights and Oversight, of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
110th Cong. (2008). See generally 154 Cong. Rec. 13, 17840 (2008); Hearing on U.S.-Iraq Long-
Term Security Agreement, Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2008); Status of 
Forces Agreements and U.N. Mandates: What Authorities and Protections Do They Provide to U.S. 
Personnel?, Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Human Rights and Oversight of the H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 110–53 (2008); International Relations Budget for Fiscal Year 2009, 
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs (2008); The November 26 Declaration of Principles: 
Implications for U.N. Resolutions on Iraq and for Congressional Oversight, Before the Subcomm. on 
Int’l Orgs., Human Rights and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008); 
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the Department of Defense, Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 
110th Cong. (2008); Letter from Jeffrey T. Bergner, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, to the Honorable Gary Ackerman, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Middle East and 
South Asia Comm. on Foreign Affairs, H.R. (Mar. 5, 2008) (available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138828.pdf). 
 187.  See Logan, supra note 185. 
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The initiation and termination of the War in Afghanistan have followed 
similar paths as the wars against Iraq.  U.S. forces remain in Afghanistan as 
part of a broad NATO-based coalition pursuant to the congressional AUMF 
passed on September 18, 2001.188  The 2001 AUMF allowed the use of force 
against nations, organizations, and persons connected to the terrorist attacks, 
distinguishing the war from those in Iraq as a war against non-state actors.189  
The President has announced that most combat forces will leave the country 
by 2014 (when Afghanistan forces will take over security of the country).190  
In April 2012, the President signed a strategic partnership agreement with 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai that will regulate U.S.-Afghanistan relations 
after 2014.191  Like the Iraq wars, there has been no peace treaty.192 
What does the absence of formal peace treaties in recent major wars 
suggest about Congress’s constitutional role in terminating war?  The 
President continues to seek and receive authorization from Congress to 
initiate major wars; however, Congress has acquiesced in allowing the 
executive to establish the terms of peace.193  Unlike in other wars since 1945, 
with respect to the war in Afghanistan, Congress has not significantly relied 
on the power of the purse to control the direction of the war.194  Oona 
Hathaway’s argument—that the President’s increased use of executive 
agreements that do not require congressional approval actually undermines 
the President’s ability to negotiate as effectively as possible—has great 
purchase.195  Because the executive negotiators are “unable to point to the 
need to obtain congressional support as a reason for insisting on a better deal 
for the United States,” the other party can demand concessions from the 
 
 188.  See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 189.  See id. 
 190.  See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President at ISAF Meeting on 
Afghanistan (May 21, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2012/05/21/president-obama-speaks-isaf-meeting-afghanistan#transcript). 
 191.  Alissa J. Rubin, With Pact, U.S. Agrees to Help Afghans for Years to Come, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2012, at A1, available at http://nytimes.com/2012/04/23/world/asia/us-and-afghanistan-
reach-partnership-agreement.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 192.  See Karen DeYoung & Ernesto Londoño, In Afghanistan, U.S. Losing Patience As Deadline 
for Long-Term Deal Nears, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-
10-10/world/42902092_1_aimal-faizi-u-s-forces-afghan-taliban. 
 193.  See Logan, supra note 185. 
 194.  As the Iraq War grew unpopular, some in Congress did consider possible ways to end the 
war, sparking legal scholarship on the issue.  Accord Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders 
Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 291, 342 (2006) (arguing that Congress could end a 
fully authorized war through appropriations). 
 195.  Hathaway, supra note 149, at 233–36. 
[Vol. 41: 685, 2014] Ending Perpetual War? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
720 
President that are greater than what Congress would have consented to.196  
Thus, under some circumstances, concerted engagement by both the 
President and the Senate can bring about the end of a war on better terms 
than if the President were to act alone. 
B.  Emergent Constitutional Themes 
1.  Functional Symmetry in Declared and Undeclared Wars 
Historical practice regarding war initiation and termination can clearly 
be divided between pre-World War II wars and post-World War II wars.  
Congress has declared war on five occasions, all before the creation of the 
United Nations.  Each of these wars was terminated through a relatively 
robust process that involved the executive and legislative branches of 
government, peace treaty negotiations, and the ratification of peace 
treaties.197  The Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles after World 
War I and subsequent congressional resolutions ending the war arguably 
marked the height of congressional involvement in war termination before 
World War II.   
The wars after World War II reflect a different paradigm, where 
Congress no longer formally declares war, nor plays a part in the creation of 
a peace treaty.198  One could make the argument that based on the pre-World 
War II historical practice of treaty ratification or congressional resolutions 
associated with the end of wars, the President should not be able to terminate 
a war without congressional authorization.  On the other hand, some 
commentators contend that post-World War II historical practice indicates 
that congressional approval is not necessary to terminate the War in 
Afghanistan, or other recent operations, formally.199   
This Article contends that although neither congressional authorization 
 
 196.  Id. at 234–35.  Hathaway’s argument is based on decision theory concepts developed in 
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 19 (1980). 
 197.  See supra Part II.A.1–2 and accompanying notes. 
 198.  See discussion supra Parts II.A.3 and accompanying notes. 
 199.  See generally Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1287–88 (The United States concluded more than 
ten times as many executive agreements as treaties in the 1990s; evidence that the President now can 
act without congressional approval to sign international treaties.); Adam Klein, Comment, The End 
of Al Qaeda?  Rethinking the Legal End of the War on Terror, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (2010) 
(discussing war termination jurisprudence and suggesting the 2001 AUMF should not be considered 
to provide the President war powers of an unlimited duration).   
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nor congressional engagement is a necessary condition for constitutional war 
termination, ending wars without congressional engagement generates 
tension with the principles of the separation of powers, and the Framers’ 
expectation that the treaty-making power would be held and exercised 
concurrently by the President and Congress.200 
Although Congress has not formally declared war since World War II, 
Congress still influences the war authorization process pursuant to its 
constitutional authority under the Declare War Clause.201  In the decades 
since World War II, presidents have authorized military operations without 
congressional authorization on numerous occasions,202 and Congress has 
largely acquiesced to these actions.203  Jack Goldsmith contends that this 
trend reflects an era devoid of formal declarations of war and increased 
autonomy for presidents in the war authorization process.204  However, 
presidents have often sought some form of congressional consultation or 
 
 200.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 201.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  One could argue that the word, “declare,” in the Declare War 
Clause encompasses either a formal declaration or an authorization of the commencement of 
hostilities.  See Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1545 
(2002).  See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 68; BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 
145, at 220.  
 202.  Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology 
Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 846–47 (1996) (“During the Cold War era . . . [p]residents often simply 
informed Congress of deployment decisions already made, or nominally consulted with some 
members, but rarely asked the full Congress to authorize combat operations.  Congress, despite its 
constitutional power to ‘declare War,’ grew comfortable playing a reactive role during the Cold War 
years, ‘scolding’ the President after the fact if military action went wrong, but rarely insisting on 
advance approval even when doing so might have been possible.  This war powers pattern—
reinforced by judicial abstention—was heralded by many presidents as an appropriate and necessary 
response to the Cold War . . . .  Strong arguments can be made that this pattern of presidential 
assertion and congressional passivity was never constitutionally sound.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 203.  In addition, the Supreme Court has considered the underlying constitutional war powers 
question a non-justiciable political question.  See Jonathan L. Entin, The Dog That Rarely Barks: 
Why the Courts Won’t Resolve the War Powers Debate, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1305, 1306–13 
(1997); Louis Henkin, The Constitution for Its Third Century: Foreign Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 
713, 714 (1989); see also ELY, supra note 159, at 54 (“[A] tacit deal has existed between the 
executive and legislative branches . . . to the effect that the president will take the responsibility . . . 
so long as he can make the decisions, and Congress will forego actual policy-making authority so 
long as it doesn’t have to be held accountable.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) 
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1304–05 
(1988) (arguing that Congress often lacks the political will to challenge a President’s unilateral 
military action). 
 204.  BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 145, at 268–69.  Since the Vietnam War, there have 
been at least sixteen major U.S. military operations, eleven of which have received no congressional 
authorization.  Id. at 359–60. 
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authorization, and most of the major U.S. military operations since World 
War II have been preceded by congressional authorization.205  Congressional 
authorizations for the use of military force and war appropriations have been 
viewed as the functional equivalent of a formal congressional declaration of 
war, as with the Vietnam-era Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; this has 
occasionally involved post hoc ratifications of the use of military force after 
such operations are already under-way.206 
2.  Absence of Functional Equivalent to Peace Treaty 
Even though Congress played a strong role in terminating wars 
throughout the first hundred years of the U.S. through peace treaties, since 
the end of World War II, Congress has not settled on an equivalent means of 
fulfilling its constitutional role in war termination.   The lack of a formal 
declaration of war may explain the lack of a formal peace treaty terminating 
the war.  Functionally, however, there is no equivalent method to end a war 
that would involve Congress—except for perhaps relying on the 
appropriations process or repealing an authorization to use force.207  
Congress has not consistently used either method.  Given that both 
constitutional mechanisms would require a two-thirds majority to override a 
likely presidential veto, neither serves as an adequate substitute for the 
treaty-making process.  Unlike submission of a peace treaty by the President, 
requiring two-thirds of the Senate to consent, an appropriations restriction or 
legislation repealing a force authorization would both require significantly 
more political will from Congress, while also potentially cutting the 
President out of the decision to terminate the war.208   
 
 205.  Most recently the 2001 AUMF for Afghanistan, see supra note 5, and the 2002 AUMF 
against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002), preceded the last two major U.S. wars.  
The Vietnam War was preceded by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.  Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. 
L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).  Additionally, some scholars argue that under the Take Care 
Clause, Article II, Section 2, Presidents can initiate military actions based on U.N. Security Council 
resolutions without congressional authorization.  See, e.g., The Constitutional Roles of Congress and 
the President in Declaring and Waging War, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 426 
(1991) (statement of Robert F. Turner). 
 206.  GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR:  THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 
1950–1975 (2d ed. 1986); GARY HESS, PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS OF WAR:  KOREA, VIETNAM, AND 
THE PERSIAN GULF (2001); WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 159; see, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, 
supra note 68 (regarding congressional ratification of military action post September 11, 2001). 
 207.  Scholars disagree about whether a repeal of an authorization can terminate a war.  See infra 
note 312 and accompanying text.   
 208.  See generally infra note 282. 
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III.  TWO MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR TERMINATION 
POWERS 
In this part, the Article addresses two misconceptions germane to 
interpreting constitutional war termination powers.  The first is that 
Congress has the power to terminate war unilaterally pursuant to its power to 
declare war.  As the Article explains, the Declare War Clause does not give 
Congress the corresponding power to declare an end to war.  Further, war 
termination powers must be grounded in the power to negotiate and 
conclude treaties, and treaty negotiations necessarily involve the executive 
branch. 
The second misconception is that, as a constitutional matter, it is 
unproblematic for the President to make peace treaties without congressional 
consent.  The power to end war is inextricably linked to the power to make 
treaties.  Not only is the treaty power held concurrently by Congress and the 
President, but historical practice suggests that war termination agreements 
should involve congressional concurrence.  
A.  Congressional Power to Declare Peace Unilaterally 
Some scholars have suggested that Congress’s constitutional power 
“[t]o declare [w]ar”209  implies a corollary power to declare peace,210 or that 
 
 209.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  As constitutional framer James Wilson of Pennsylvania 
noted: 
It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such 
distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this 
declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives: from 
this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national interest 
can draw us into a war.   
See JAMES MADISON, The DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL . . . 488 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1876). 
 210.  See WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
312 (43d ed. 1871) (asserting that since Congress can declare war, as well as provide or withhold the 
means to carry it out, it may also “declare or recognize peace”); Leonard G. Ratner, The 
Coordinated Warmaking Power—Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Tools, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 
470 (1971) (“Congress may terminate as well as authorize hostilities, i.e. declare peace as well as 
war.”); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 87 (1991) (discussing Blackstone’s 
statement “that under English law,” the power to declare war implies the power to declare peace); 
see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 76, 371 n.66 
(2d ed. 1996) (arguing that although the congressional power to make peace was not generally 
accepted following World War I, “the power to end the state of war by resolution is now well 
established;” noting that a congressional declaration of war or authorization for the use of military 
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the congressional power to declare peace is derivative of its power to repeal 
legislation.211  Some of these scholars contend that the constitutional power 
of Congress to terminate war is grounded in Supreme Court precedent,212 
while others assert that it is based in historical practice.213  
Whether this interpretation of congressional war termination powers 
reflects the understanding of the Founders is an open question.214  Although 
 
force may exercise war termination powers by temporal conditions: “Congress can decide when war 
should end by imposing a time limit on its duration when it authorizes war, or by defining the 
purposes of the war in terms that imply that it shall end when those purposes are achieved.”).  But cf. 
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War 
Powers, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 167, 268–69 (1996) (contending that the Framers “believed that a decision 
as significant as peace could not be made without [the President’s] consent”).  
 211.  See JAMES R. TUCKER, 2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 718 (1899) (“Is there 
no end to the war except at the will of the President and Senate?  No authority can be cited on the 
question, but the writer thinks a repeal of a law requiring war would be effectual to bring about the 
status of peace in place of war.”); Simeon E. Baldwin, The Share of the President of the United 
States in a Declaration of War, 12 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 13–14 (1918) (“Peace could, no doubt, also be 
restored by an Act of Congress.  As a declaration of war takes the shape with us of a statute, it would 
seem that it can be repealed by a statute.”); Edward S. Corwin, The Power of Congress to Declare 
Peace, 18 MICH. L. REV. 669, 674–75 (1920).  But see, e.g., Mathews, supra note 11, at 831 (noting 
that Congress may not repeal a statute admitting a state to the Union and the same logic may apply 
to a repeal of a declaration of war, though noting such an analogy does not necessarily mean that no 
such power exists). 
 212.  See HENKIN, supra note 210, at 370–71 n.66 (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 
(1948), for the proposition that “‘[t]he State of War’ may be terminated by treaty or legislation or 
Presidential proclamation,” but not acknowledging that the Court there examined an issue of 
statutory interpretation—whether the “declared war,” had terminated, not whether the state of war 
had terminated).   
 213.  These scholars emphasize that U.S. involvement in both World War I and World War II was 
terminated by a joint resolution of Congress.  See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 210, at 76; see also 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93D CONG., CONGRESS AND THE TERMINATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR 2 
(Comm. Print 1973) (noting that the congressional resolutions pronouncing the end of both of the 
world wars are generally used by authorities to mark the definitive ends of those wars).   
 214.  Regarding the balance of executive and congressional war powers, Madison wrote, 
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, 
whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded.  They are barred from 
the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which 
separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting 
laws.  
6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).  See MADISON, supra note 4, at 
525–26 (discussing that the founders debated and rejected the idea of allowing the Senate to make 
peace treaties without the concurrence of the President as it would require with other treaties).  
Moreover, James Madison praised the allocation of war powers when he wrote: “In no part of the 
[C]onstitution is more wisdom to be found, than the clause which confides the question of war or 
peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department.”  See ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
(PACIFICUS) & JAMES MADISON (HELVIDIUS), LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUS ON THE 
PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY OF 1793 89 (J. & G. S. Gideon1845).  
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there is no explicit reference to the power to declare peace in the 
Constitution,215 the deliberations at the Constitutional Convention show that 
the Founders considered and ultimately rejected the view that Congress 
should possess the constitutional power to declare peace.216  Pierce Butler, 
for example, proposed an amendment that would have added the words, 
“and peace,” after “declare war,” and would arguably have granted Congress 
the power to declare peace.217  Another founding proponent of granting 
Congress the power to declare peace, Charles Pinckney, argued that “[i]t 
would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace,”218 and 
his claim was buttressed by William Blackstone’s view that “wherever the 
right resides of beginning a national war, there also must reside the right of 
ending it, or the power of making peace.”219  The Founders believed that 
constitutional war termination powers must be grounded in the power to 
 
 215.  The absence of an explicit reference to the peace power in the Constitution is particularly 
conspicuous, given that this peace power was included in the Articles of Confederation—under 
which the Continental Congress possessed the “sole and exclusive right and power of determining on 
peace and war.”  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. IX.  The Founders’ decision to vest in 
the Continental Congress the peace power did not reflect a judgment that the power was legislative 
in character; further, as the national government only included one branch—the legislative branch—
the Founders did not vest the peace power in the legislative branch to maintain federal checks and 
balances.  See JOHN YOO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE PRELUDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 73–75 
(2006).  Instead, federalism concerns regarding the desire to withhold the peace power from the 
states motivated the Founders to vest the peace power with the Continental Congress.  See id. (noting 
that under the Articles of Confederation, most legislative powers were retained by the state, and 
arguing that Congress received the war and peace powers to replace the vacancy left in the executive 
power by the Crown and to unify foreign relations under the national government).  Indeed, during a 
debate over whether or not the executive power under the new Constitution ought to reside in one 
person, James Rutledge opined that the sole executive ought to have the full executive power, save 
for the power of war and peace, suggesting that the understanding of the time was that declarations 
of war and peace were inherently executive powers.  See MADISON, supra note 4, at 140. 
 216.  Notwithstanding these attempts, opponents of granting Congress the exclusive power to 
terminate war prevailed.  Here are two examples of the prevailing view.  Oliver Ellsworth argued 
that “[t]here is a material difference between the cases of making war and making peace.  It should 
be more easy to get out of war, than in to it.  War also is a simple and overt declaration, peace 
attended with intricate and secret negotiations.”  See JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION 548 (E. H. Scott ed., 1898).  Further, George Mason disfavored “giving the power of 
war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it .†.†. .  He was for clogging rather than 
facilitating war; but for facilitating peace.  He preferred ‘declare’ to ‘make’.”  See 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 290 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911) (emphases in 
original).  
 217.  See MADISON, supra note 216, at 548–49. 
 218.  Id. at 548. 
 219.  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *258.   
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negotiate and conclude treaties,220 and in the importance of the President’s 
ability to negotiate peace treaties in secret.221  For these reasons, it is 
doubtful that, as a constitutional matter, the Founders believed that a 
congressional declaration of peace could terminate a legal state of war. 
Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to decide whether 
a war has ended,222 various Court cases during the Civil War, Spanish-
American War, and World War I eras suggest that Congress should not 
terminate war without presidential consent.223  Further, the unique historical 
circumstances surrounding the Treaty of Versailles after World War I 
compelled consideration of alternative means of war termination.    
After World War II, in Ludecke v. Watkins, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the provisions of the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 had 
expired based on whether the “declared war” referenced in the statute had 
ended.224  The Court noted that “‘[t]he state of war’ may be terminated by 
treaty or legislation or Presidential proclamation.  Whatever the mode, its 
termination is a political act.”225  The Court clarified that by “state of war” it 
was referring to the end-life of the statute and was not addressing the 
question of who has the authority to declare peace.226  Consequently, the 
 
 220.  See JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
1173, at 98 (Little, Brown & Co. 1858) (explaining that a congressional power to make peace was 
unanimously rejected at the Convention in favor of making peace through treaty). 
 221.  Concerns over secrecy contributed both to the constitutional Founders’ decision to ensure 
presidential involvement in the treaty-making process, as well as their rejection of Madison’s 
proposal to “authorize a concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate to make treaties of peace, without 
the concurrence of the President.” MADISON, supra note 4, at 525–26.  As Roger Sherman of 
Connecticut argued, “the necessity of secrecy in the case of treaties forbade a reference of them to 
the whole legislature.”  Id. at 523.  Further, Governor Morris, concerned about the provincial focus 
of Senators on individual states, argued “that no peace ought to be made without the concurrence of 
the President, who was the general guardian of the national interests.”  Id. at 524. 
 222.  During the U.S. Civil War the Supreme Court held that whether there existed a state of war 
between the North and the South was “a question to be decided by [the President], and this Court 
must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which 
this power was entrusted.”  The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862) (emphasis omitted).  
One hundred years after the Prize Cases decision, the Court observed, in Baker v. Carr, that 
“isolable reasons for the presence of political questions, underlying this Court’s refusal to review the 
political departments’ determination of when or whether a war has ended.”).  369 U.S. 186, 213 
(1962). 
 223.  See supra Part II. 
 224.  335 U.S. 160 (1948). 
 225.  See supra note 139. 
 226.  See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 168–69 n.13; id. at 169 (“Whether and when it would be open to 
this Court to find that a war though merely formally kept alive had in fact ended, is a question too 
fraught with gravity even to be adequately formulated when not compelled.”). 
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Court’s observation regarding “termination by legislation” seems to be a 
method by which the statute, not the war, could be terminated.227  Because 
no treaty had been concluded before the Court issued its decision, the Court 
examined whether a presidential proclamation had been issued to determine 
whether peace had been restored.228 
Scholars, who support Congress’ power to declare peace, point to past 
practice in which Congress attempted to (or terminated) a war by placing 
restrictions on the use of funds to limit the President’s use of U.S. forces.229 
B.  Presidential Peace Treaty-Making in a Vacuum 
Some scholars argue that the history of the Treaty Clause suggests that 
although the Founders rejected numerous attempts to impose substantive 
limits on the treaty-making power,230 they did not believe that either 
Congress or the President should have the power to make treaties 
unilaterally.231  Many scholars contend that sole executive agreements—
 
 227.  See supra note 139. 
 228.  See supra note 227; see also Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 170 (“The political branch of the 
Government has not brought the war with Germany to an end.  On the contrary, it has proclaimed 
that ‘a state of war still exists.’” (citations omitted)). 
 229.  See Exercising Congress’ Constitutional Power to End a War: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 11 (2007) (statement of David J. Barron, Professor of Law, Harvard 
Law School) (“given all that we know about the Framers’ understandings and all the precedents that 
we have had over 200 years of the Nation’s history of engagement in military conflicts, that it is 
clear that the measures being considered, as I understand them, fall well within the substantial zone 
of authority that Congress possesses.”).  
 230.  See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1085 (2000) (contending that 
in defining the contours of the treaty power, the Founders prioritized procedural over substantive 
limitations); see also Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1276–85 (examining the founding history 
surrounding the treaty power). 
 231.  At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson explained that the treaty-making 
power is not held exclusively by either political branch: “Neither the President nor the Senate, 
solely, can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other, and are so balanced as to produce 
security to the people.”  See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 507 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937).  Similarly, Charles Pinckney and 
James Madison maintained that the treaty-making process necessarily involves both the executive 
and the legislative branches.  See id. at 265, 347; see also Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole 
Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1587 (2007) (“The history of the Treaty Clause reveals 
that the Founders did not trust any single actor to make treaties on its own.  The drafters denied both 
the Senate and the President sole power to make treaties.  Instead, they assigned the power to the 
President acting in conjunction with a supermajority of the Senate.  This carefully considered 
procedure thus tends to rebut any suggestion that the President has unilateral power to make 
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international agreements concluded based on the President’s exclusive 
constitutional authority—may only be concluded under a limited set of 
circumstances,232 and raise questions about whether the constitutional 
authority of the President to conclude such non-treaty agreements to resolve 
international conflicts.233  Some of these scholars consider unilateral 
presidential action on international agreements unconstitutional and 
undemocratic.234  Finally, notwithstanding debates about the constitutionality 
of sole executive war termination agreements, there is still a question of 
whether war termination agreements require congressional approval under 
the Treaty Clause.235 
Among the more prominent voices in this debate, Oona Hathaway 
argues “the President may not commit the United States to an international 
agreement on his own if he would be unable to carry out the obligations 
created by the agreement on his own in the absence of an agreement.”236  
 
‘Treaties’ simply by calling them ‘agreements.’”). 
 232.  Executive agreements are generally referred to as non-treaty agreements.  See CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE 65, 76–78 (Comm. Print 2001).  In terms of the specific debate regarding sole 
executive agreements—not limited to the war termination context—Oona Hathaway is one of the 
most prominent advocates of construing narrowing the President’s authority to conclude executive 
agreements without prior congressional approval.  Hathaway argues that the intent of the framers of 
the Constitution was that international agreements would almost exclusively be enacted pursuant to 
the treaty power, except in very limited circumstances.  Hathaway, supra note 149, at 266–67.  
Michael Ramsey argues that under the founding intent, sole executive agreements were limited to 
minor and temporary issues and they required legislative implementation.  Michael D. Ramsey, 
Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 218–40 (1998).  Bradford 
Clark agrees with this analysis of the founding generation’s view of executive agreements.  Clark, 
supra note 231, at 1574–75.  For further discussion of functional arguments against such executive 
agreements, see Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive 
Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998). 
 233.  Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by the 
President, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (2003) (citing HENKIN, supra note 210, at 219–24). 
 234.  Hathaway stresses that an imbalance in power between the President and Congress due to 
unilateral presidential action and congressional delegation of authority.  Hathaway, supra note 149, 
at 266–67.  Normatively, Hathaway argues the current system—in which executive agreements far 
outnumber Senate approved treaties—is undemocratic and may lead to less effective international 
agreements.  Id. at 230–38.  See generally Wuerth, supra note 233. 
 235.  See Abraham C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by 
“Agreements or Compacts”?, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 460 (1936) (The Founders may have 
understood “treaties” to encompass “treaties of peace, of amity and commerce, consular 
conventions, [or] treaties of navigation.”). 
 236.  Hathaway, supra note 149, at 212.  Hathaway continues:  
Hence, the President cannot enter an agreement that requires the appropriation of funds or 
declares war without congressional approval of the agreement, because the President 
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According to Hathaway’s test, the President could commit the U.S. pursuant 
to an international war termination agreement, so long as the commitment 
thus undertaken could be discharged without congressional action in the 
absence of such an agreement.237  War termination, however, is an area 
where the President could carry out the terms of the agreement without 
congressional action.  As the Commander in Chief and the Chief Executive 
of the U.S.,238 the President has the constitutional authority to withdraw U.S. 
forces from a theater of combat, to recognize countries and international 
boundaries,239 and to resolve international claims and other elements that 
typically are included in war termination agreements.240  If the President is 
constitutionally responsible for the individual elements of a standard peace 
treaty, in Hathaway’s view, he may conclude the entire peace agreement 
unilaterally.241 
But the whole constitutional war termination power is greater than the 
sum of the obligations that may be undertaken in any such peace agreement.  
Notwithstanding the President’s broad unilateral authority to conclude sole 
executive agreements concerning foreign affairs matters involving the 
President’s independent war powers, founding history, political branch 
practice, and case law reflect the substantial extent to which the power to 
make peace treaties was not meant to be held exclusively by the President.  
Congress has a prominent role to play in making peace treaties, and 
determining how and when war should end—even in the absence of a peace 
treaty or other war termination agreement. 
The text of Article II of the Constitution makes plain that “[the 
President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”242  Further, Article I provides that “[n]o State shall, without the 
 
cannot take these actions in the absence of an agreement.  The President may not use a 
sole executive agreement with another nation, in other words, to expand his powers 
beyond those granted to him in the Constitution. 
Id.  Bradford Clark concurs with this idea: “Simply put, courts should permit a sole executive 
agreement to override preexisting legal rights only when the President has independent authority to 
do so.”  Clark, supra note 231, at 1577. 
 237.  See supra note 236. 
 238.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 239.  Clark, supra note 231, at 1637 (discussing the Presidential recognition of the Soviet Union 
via a sole executive agreement). 
 240.  Id. at 1635–37 (discussing presidential authority to settle claims). 
 241.  See Hathaway, supra note 149, at 212. 
 242.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Under the Supremacy Clause, treaties are “the supreme Law 
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Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a 
foreign Power.”243  This clause implies that there are types of international 
agreements that fall outside of the treaty power.244  As a constitutional 
matter, for the President to terminate a war unilaterally by international 
agreement, he must use a non-treaty mechanism—such as an executive 
agreement.   
Absent a congressional declaration of war, why is congressional action 
in peace treaty-making important?  The historical record of congressional 
involvement at both the start and end of wars supports the argument that 
congressional action should be a necessary part of the war termination 
process.245  As a practical matter, if Congress does not perform its role in 
terminating war,246 arguably, future presidents would have the ability to re-
initiate wars that had been terminated by prior presidents without 
congressional authorization.247  In other words, if Congress makes no 
statutory changes, ten years from now, the President might have the 
authority to disregard the sole executive agreement and proclamation ending 
combat operations in Iraq and deploy U.S. forces back into Iraq without 
congressional assent248—such congressional abdication of war termination 
power risks significantly expanding the President’s ability to re-prosecute 
prior wars. 
The Supreme Court has upheld, as constitutionally valid, some sole 
 
of the Land.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 243.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 244.  See Wuerth, supra note 233, at 11; see also Clark, supra note 231, at 1587–88.  For 
scholarship emphasizing both structural and implied text, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 798 (1999) (“When extended beyond paragraphism to 
encompass the entire document, holistic textualism has an obvious virtue: it invites readers to ponder 
connections between noncontiguous clauses that have no textual overlap, yet nevertheless cross-
illuminate.”). 
 245.  Even if Congress may not be able to pass a peace treaty in some wars—such as those with 
non-state actors—it could still pass congressional-executive agreements that would achieve the same 
purposes.  See Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1286–88 (arguing that congressional-executive 
agreements are preferred over Article II treaties). 
 246.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 247.  See generally U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 248.  See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498; Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship 
and Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, pmbl., 
Nov. 17, 2008, Temp. State Dep’t No. 09-7, KAV 8552; Barack Obama, President of the U.S., 
Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation of the End of Combat Operations in Iraq (Aug. 
31, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-
president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq). 
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executive agreements that received no congressional approval.249  The Court, 
however, has never ruled on the narrower issue of sole executive war 
termination agreements.250  Because the Court has not addressed the precise 
legal question that determines the constitutionality of unilateral war 
termination agreements, it is useful to consider the interpretive guidance 
reflected in founding history, prior political branch practice, and the 
Constitution’s text.251 
In the post-World War II era, a variety of executive agreements have 
been concluded as part of efforts to wind down or simply terminate conflicts, 
and have taken the place of formal, Senate-approved peace treaties.  For 
instance, U.S. relations with Iraq252 and with Afghanistan253 are governed by 
long-term strategic agreements enacted as sole executive agreements.  Both 
of these agreements (which are more similar in language and scope to 
previous declarations of war)254 were signed before the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from those countries, and reflect the President’s ability to determine 
unilaterally the terms of withdrawal and postwar bilateral interactions.  
Additionally, the combat operations in Iraq ended with a presidential 
 
 249.  See infra note 250; see also Clark, supra note 231, at 1575–77.  In addition to sole executive 
agreements, there are also congressional-executive agreements that are not subject to the Advice and 
Consent Clause.  HENKIN, supra note 210, at 217 (“[I]t is now widely accepted that the 
Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is a complete 
alternative to a treaty.”).  See generally Paul, supra note 232 (arguing the President’s foreign policy 
power should be reduced). 
 250.  In United States v. Belmont, the Court stated in dicta that sole executive agreements are 
constitutionally valid international agreements.  301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).  Belmont concerned an 
executive agreements preemption of state law, but, there, the Court did not address narrower legal 
questions regarding war termination agreements.  Id. at 331; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654 (1981) (broadly asserting the President’s right to enter into sole executive agreements 
relating to settling claims).  American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi also affirmed the Court’s 
statement in Dames & Moore that the President can enter into sole executive agreements.  Am. Ins. 
Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).  In 1942, in United States v. Pink, the Court also 
affirmed FDR’s sole executive agreement that recognized the Soviet Union.  315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 251.  In Ludecke v. Watkins, the Court stated that war is terminated not by cessation of hostilities, 
but by a political act, including by a peace treaty; the Court, however, observed this point in dicta.  
335 U.S. 160, 168–69 (1948).   
 252.  Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation Between 
the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, pmbl., Nov. 17, 2008, Temp. State 
Dep’t No. 09-7, KAV 8552. 
 253.  Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, U.S.-Afg., pmbl., May 2, 2012, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.  
 254.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 68, at 2072–83. 
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announcement255 and the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq.  Status of Forces 
Agreements have also become common between the U.S. and other 
countries during and after hostilities.256  The U.S. also signs defense 
agreements, memoranda of understanding, and trade agreements with 
countries after combat operations have ended.257 
  The Founders disagreed on which branch of government would be 
responsible for war termination.258  Actions at the Constitutional Convention 
and statements of one group of Founders support the view that the President 
has a unilateral power to terminate wars, while James Madison and James 
Monroe believed in a strong congressional role in war termination.259  At the 
Constitutional Convention, the Founders considered giving Congress the 
power to declare peace, but this proposal was rejected.260  Similarly, the 
Articles of Confederation gave Congress the “sole and exclusive right and 
power of determining on peace and war.”261   The omission of an enumerated 
congressional power to declare or make peace supports the argument that the 
Framers intended for the President to take the lead262 or even have unilateral 
war termination powers.263  Several attendees of the Convention (such as 
Oliver Ellsworth and George Mason) added that Congress should not have 
the power to declare peace for policy reasons—indicating that they favored 
 
 255.  See supra note 184  
 256.  Status of Forces Agreements commonly deal with criminal jurisdiction of U.S. armed forces 
members that remain in the target country, financial issues, and other agreements related to the 
continued U.S. presence in a country.  R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34531, 
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? (2012). 
 257.  Other examples of bilateral agreements (not limited to the context of war termination 
agreements) include “nonbinding resolutions, exchanges of notes, joint communiques, joint 
declarations,,modi vivendi, political agreements, administrative agreements, voluntary guidelines, 
handshakes, verbal promises, unperfected acts, arrangements, letters of intent, statements of intent, 
statements of principles, declarations of principles, ‘best practices,’ exchanges of letters, unspoken 
rules, gentlemen’s agreements, and side letters.”  Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International 
Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113, 114 (2003). 
 258.  See MADISON, supra note 216, at 547–49. 
 259.  See id. 
 260.  Pierce Butler proposed an amendment to give Congress the power to declare peace, but this 
amendment was rejected at the Constitutional Convention.  See MADISON, supra note 216, at 547–
49; JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 73 (2005). 
 261.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 1.  
 262.  It could also imply that the power to declare peace was shared between the President and 
Congress through the treaty approval and ratification process. 
 263.  See Yoo, supra note 210, at 268–69 (stating the Framers “believed that a decision as 
significant as peace could not be made without [the President’s] consent” (emphasis omitted)). 
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unilateral presidential declarations of peace.264  Oliver Ellsworth remarked 
that “[t]here is a material difference between the cases of making war and 
making peace. . . . War also is a simple and overt declaration, peace attended 
with intricate and secret negotiations.”265  Similarly, George Mason stated 
that “[h]e was for clogging, rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating 
peace.”266   
There were other members of the founding generation, who advocated a 
strong congressional role in war termination.  James Madison supported a 
robust congressional war termination power.267  He attempted, but failed, to 
lower the threshold for Senate approval of a peace treaty to a simple 
majority.268  In 1818, Congress authorized James Monroe to negotiate with 
Great Britain over militarization of the Great Lakes.269  Monroe reached an 
agreement with Britain, but the President felt the need to ask Congress if the 
document should be approved as a treaty or could be ratified unilaterally.270  
Congress passed a resolution in which two-thirds of the Senate concurred 
with the agreement.271  Although this agreement was not a formal treaty, 
Monroe’s actions are evidence the founding generation did not think the 
President had broad unilateral authority to enter into sole executive 
agreements that concerned defense issues.272   
It is also noteworthy that the Constitutional Convention rejected 
proposals that would have given the President exclusive power over treaty-
making.273  Even Alexander Hamilton, a strong proponent of executive 
power, apparently believed in the importance of both political branches 
participating in the treaty-making process.274  The fact that the Founders did 
not want the broad treaty power to be exclusively in the hands of the 
President, could support an argument that international war termination 
 
 264.  See MADISON, supra note 216, at 549. 
 265.  See id. at 548. 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  For broader historical arguments that Congress can enact strong regulation of the President 
during ongoing wars, see Barron & Lederman, supra note 46, at 689. 
 268.  See MADISON, supra note 216, at 685–86. 
 269.  See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 85–86 (1904). 
 270.  Id. at 85. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  See Hathaway, supra note 149, at 170–71. 
 273.  Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause As a Case 
Study, in 1 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 233, 242–43 (1984). 
 274.   1 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 308 
(1902). 
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agreements have to be approved by Congress.275 
Broadly, sole executive agreements have been used by presidents to 
unilaterally enact international agreements since the founding era.276  From 
1980 to 2000, presidents unilaterally entered into 543 defense agreements.277  
On defense issues, presidents have also unilaterally signed numerous status 
of forces agreements with foreign countries.278  In terms of war termination 
agreements, pre-World War II congressional approval of formal peace 
treaties was the standard practice for major wars.279  However, since World 
War II, as the United States has engaged in more frequent military 
operations—many of which have been of a short duration—presidents have 
unilaterally ended wars—often without any formal legal termination 
agreement.280 
There is, thus, a strong post-World War II trend of unilateral presidential 
action to terminate wars, and an absence of congressionally approved peace 
treaties or other war termination agreements.  Such strong historical 
evidence in the post-World War II era has enhanced the President’s authority 
to terminate wars unilaterally through executive agreements and presidential 
proclamations.281 
IV.  THE PROPER ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL WAR TERMINATION 
The Founders did not envision a constitutional order in which one 
political branch would circumvent the other to end a war.  Instead, the 
Founders designed a war termination process rooted in the treaty power—
divided between the President and the Senate—in order to facilitate genuine 
 
 275.  See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2013) (identifying the various statements of the Founders on the importance 
of both political branches being involved in treaty-making). 
 276.  Ramsey, supra note 232, at 173–74. 
 277.  See Hathaway, supra note 149, at 150–52.  This includes ex ante agreements in which 
Congress gave the President authority to unilaterally negotiate.  Id. at 152 n.18. 
 278.  Id. at 153 
 279.  Id. at 144. 
 280.  See id. at 168 (“The collapse of Europe, the creation of the United Nations, and the 
newfound leadership of the United States in the world community generated increased demand for 
international lawmaking by the United States.  In response, Congress began delegating more and 
more authority to the President to make international agreements.”). 
 281.  See GLEN S. KRUTZ & JEFFREY S. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF EXECUTIVE 
AGREEMENTS: INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN A SYSTEM OF SHARED POWERS 41 (2009). 
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cooperation between Congress and the President in terminating war.282  
Observing the constitutional checks and balances as well as the separation of 
powers serves the functional purpose of ensuring that the U.S. speaks with a 
single voice—and acts accordingly—when it comes to post-war settlements 
and conflict resolutions.283  Examining the history of how the constitutional 
means of terminating U.S. wars have changed since the nation’s founding 
reveals at least four themes concerning the complex interaction of the 
executive and legislative branches involved in ending wars: the 
indispensability of presidential action, power balancing, promoting restraints 
on arrogation of power by any single branch, and encouraging mutuality in 
decision making. 
A.  Indispensability of Presidential Action 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s hesitance to determine whether a 
war has ended, various cases during the Civil War, Spanish-American War, 
and World War I eras indicate that the President must play a role in the 
constitutional termination of a war.284  Although early cases suggest that 
wars are terminated by peace treaties, Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & 
Warehouse Co.285 (the latest and perhaps most relevant Supreme Court 
decision on point) supports the argument that wars between states could also 
be terminated by presidential proclamation.286  This is in line with post-
 
 282.  See Mosier, supra note 52, at 1611 (“[T]he Constitution makes no mention of the power to 
declare peace, and the debates of the Constitutional Convention demonstrate that the Framers 
expected war to end by peace treaty.”); id. at 1613 (“Several important inferences can be drawn from 
the Framers’ expectation that peace would be made by treaty.  We can infer that the Framers 
intended to foreclose unilateral presidential action, because a treaty requires the concurrence of the 
President and two-thirds of the Senate.  On the other hand, while the President’s veto power over 
legislation is subject to congressional override, his treaty power is absolute: No treaty can be made 
without the President’s agreement.  Furthermore, the ability to make peace by congressional 
resolution is questionable as a matter of original intent because it creates a role for the House that 
does not exist in the treaty process.”); see also STORY, supra note 220, at 98 (explaining that a 
congressional power to make peace was unanimously rejected at the Convention in favor of making 
peace through treaty). 
 283.  See generally Mosier, supra note 52 (discussing the implications if Congress can declare 
peace by treaty and the possibility of overriding the President). 
 284.  See, e.g., Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 159–60 (1919); 
Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 316 (1904); United States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. 56, 69–
70 (1869). 
 285.  Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 160–61. 
 286.  Id. at 161. 
[Vol. 41: 685, 2014] Ending Perpetual War? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
736 
World War II practice. 
In addition, courts commonly consider prior executive branch practice 
in resolving constitutional separation of powers questions—especially in the 
sphere of foreign affairs.287  Such judicial examination reflects concerns 
associated with the structure of the Constitution: many constitutional war 
powers—such as the power to initiate war and make treaties—are held 
concurrently by the President and Congress.288  Justiciability concerns also 
play an analytical role, because such foreign policy matters may be more 
suitable for resolution by the political branches of government.289  
Consequently, in areas of concurrent constitutional authority, courts rely 
 
 287.  See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327–28 (1936).  See generally Michael J. Glennon, The 
Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 147 (1984) 
(suggesting “a method of inquiry for determining when the inaction of one branch, in the face of an 
established practice of another branch, may properly be deemed to authorize the actions of the 
latter”); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
961 (2001) (proposing the “constitutional increments” theory—”it defines and cabins the relevance 
of constitutional actors and episodes and provides the channels for constitutional discourse and 
development”).   
 288.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(detailing “a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent 
authority”); HENKIN, supra note 210, at 92, 94 (stating “some undefined zone of concurrent 
authority in which [Congress and the President] might act, at least when the other has not acted” is 
“now accepted”); see also Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (recognizing the Executive’s considerable 
foreign affairs powers are borne less out of explicit constitutional text and more out of executive 
practice providing a “gloss” on the meaning of the terse Article II text); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 
610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that though Congress possesses enumerated powers, the 
contours of constitutional executive powers are largely unenumerated and may therefore be 
determined by observing how the Executive has consistently operated, especially in light of 
congressional acquiescence).  But see Glennon, supra note 287, at 147–48 (suggesting that custom 
and past practice may resolve separation of powers dispute only when branch custom represents 
opinio juris seu necessitatis and that the other branch has indicated by more than mere silence that it 
agrees, but acknowledging that judicial practice has largely inferred congressional acquiescence 
simply out of silence).  Though the Constitution grants Congress enumerated powers, unbroken 
congressional practice may also shed light on the construction of these.  See Curtiss-Wright, 299 
U.S. at 328. 
 289.  The Supreme Court is reluctant to involve itself in these disputes because of the political, as 
opposed to judicial, ramifications of these disputes—the Court would essentially have to take a side.  
See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (“Matters intimately related to foreign policy and 
national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 
342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952) (“[Matters regarding] the conduct of foreign relations [and] the war 
power . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely 
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”). 
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heavily on interbranch understandings and historical practice.290  Congress 
legislates with a presumptive awareness of executive branch practice, but 
courts do not generally infer legislative intent to codify such practice,291 and 
any such judicial inference is typically “stronger in the foreign affairs 
arena.”292  In particular, congressional legislative silence in the face of 
consistent executive practice can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of 
presidential constitutional authority for that practice.293  
In addition, there may be functionalist reasons for courts to rely on 
executive branch practice in foreign affairs cases: Congress faces “practical 
limitations on [its] capacity to forge ex ante standards for executive national 
security action,”294 and the executive possesses superior expertise in 
marshalling and interpreting facts concerning foreign relations matters.295   
Despite the practical advantages the executive branch possesses in its 
ability to make reactive—rather than hypothetically proactive policy—the 
Constitution does allocate significant foreign relations powers to Congress—
particularly the power of appropriation and the power to make rules 
governing the land and naval forces.296  The Court has generally not taken 
 
 290.  For an example of the Court giving substantial deference to presidential practice in 
construing a foreign affairs statute, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981), which 
stated that “the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President’s authority in 
a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be 
considered to ‘invite’ ‘measures on independent presidential responsibility,”’ (quoting Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).  
 291.  See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121–23 (1978) (declining to infer legislative 
acquiescence regarding a longstanding practice of the Securities and Exchange Commission, even 
though the Senate committee with jurisdiction over the executive branch activities in question had 
long approved of the practice).  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative 
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 90–108 (1988) (explaining the risks associated with inferring 
congressional intent from legislative silence in the face of executive branch practice). 
 292.  See Eskridge, supra note 291, at 74. 
 293.  See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Supreme Court precedents indicating that 
Congressional acquiescence of consistent executive practice creates a presumption of executive 
constitutional power). 
 294.  Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in 
Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 848 (1994).   
 295.  See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321–22 (1936). 
 296.  Cf. KOH, supra note 154, at 75 (The Framers gave “Congress, not the president .†.†. the 
dominant role” with foreign affairs, which includes “all manner of powers regarding raising, 
supporting, maintaining, and regulating the army, navy, and militia, which could be exercised both 
domestically and abroad.”); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-6, at 
662–67 (3d ed. 2000) (reasoning that “the Constitution mandates a major role for Congress in 
supervising executive military operations” because the Framers “tied the military power to 
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this position regarding Congress’s independent foreign relations powers on 
the occasions that it has been willing to address the issue, primarily because 
Congress tends to imply its approval of—or acquiescence to—executive 
branch practice by refraining from objecting to practices; consequently, the 
combination of executive practice and legislative acquiescence form a gloss 
on presidential constitutional power.297 
There is some historical practice suggesting that in the absence of a 
peace treaty, presidential proclamations can serve as definitive evidence of 
the end of a war (potentially suggesting a required presidential role in ending 
a war).298  Recent wars, however, have involved neither formal declarations 
of war nor formal peace treaties.  An argument can be made that some recent 
U.S. wars were ended by negotiations that resemble treaties of peace and 
thereby, presidential participation in such negotiations preserves the spirit—
if not the formal rituals—reflected in the original constitutional design.299  
 
Congress’ control of the public purse” and the Constitution “gives Congress a host of other military-
related powers”).  “Some commentators have argued that by virtue of the Vesting Clause in Article 
II (which states that ‘[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America,’ U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1), the President has been granted all foreign affairs powers 
not expressly granted to Congress.”  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 68, at 2064 (2005) (citing 
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE 
L.J. 231, 252–54 (2001)).  “Under that theory, one might argue that if the Declare War Clause is not 
a war initiation power, then such a power has not been expressly assigned to Congress and thus must 
rest with the President.”  Bradley & Goldsmith, at 2064.  For a discussion on the Vesting Clause 
theory, see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004). 
 297.  As Professor Eskridge has observed, Dames & Moore stands for the proposition that in the 
foreign affairs context—more than in others—”the Court will routinely infer legislative approval of 
executive practices, where ‘Congress has consistently failed to object to such . . . practices even 
when it has had an opportunity to do so.”’  See Eskridge, supra note 291, at 74 (quoting Dames & 
Moore, 453 U.S. at 682 n.10); see also supra note 293.  For criticism of this method of statutory 
interpretation, see KOH, supra note 154, at 139–42. 
 298.  This proposition accords well with the argument at the Constitutional Convention that 
Congress should not have the sole power to declare peace.  As the treaty power necessarily requires 
the participation of the President in peacemaking, requiring a presidential proclamation to end the 
legal state of war in the absence of a treaty preserves the Executive’s participation in the 
peacemaking process. 
 299.  Though treaties of peace are formal legal instruments, substance and the treaty-makers’ 
intent are the primary guidelines in determining the existence of a peace treaty.  See PHILLIPSON, 
supra note 78, at 166.  Moreover, international law defines a treaty as any “‘international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,’”  including executive 
agreements or informal methods such as an exchange of diplomatic notes, but excluding memoranda 
of understanding and other such documents not intended to be governed by international law.  
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 16–18 (2d ed. 2007) (quoting Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331).  It is an open 
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Without congressional involvement, however, efforts to terminate war can 
cultivate tension with separation of powers principles and the constitutional 
values they enshrine. 
The President was indispensable in war termination even before 
Congress stopped declaring wars or the U.S. stopped ratifying peace 
treaties.300  The President, perhaps, is continuing to play a role as 
Commander in Chief and “sole organ of the federal government in the field 
of international relations” by establishing cease-fire agreements and 
declaring that war is over.301  Rather, Congress may have simply chosen to 
abdicate its traditional role in terminating war in the same way that some 
scholars argue it has done with respect to international law-making.302  
Looking through the Youngstown tripartite framework, the President’s 
actions to terminate wars unilaterally, arguably, reflect congressional 
acquiescence or the President’s own inherent authority, and thus, are not a 
constitutional defect.303  From a separation of powers perspective, however, 
Congress’s abdication of its war termination authority after World War II 
has contributed to an imbalance of power, and thereby privileging the 
President’s role in ending war.304     
B.  Congressional Appropriations Power: Means of Last Resort 
Should the purse power be Congress’s war termination power of first 
resort?  Cicero’s observation that “the sinews of war are infinite money,” 
acknowledges that the denial of funds is an extremely potent tool for ending 
war, and one that privileges Congress’s role in the constitutional war 
termination process.305  Although Congress has the constitutional authority to 
 
question as to what extent documents, which are considered treaties for international purposes but 
not domestically for the purposes of senatorial advice and consent under the treaty power, may 
constitute peace treaties. 
 300.  See supra note 282. 
 301.  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); see also Pasquantino 
v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320). 
 302.  See Hathaway, supra note 149, at 184 (arguing the Congress delegated international law 
making authority to the President due to “a combination of institutional myopia and the political 
incentives facing members of Congress”). 
 303.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585–86 (1952). 
 304.  See Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 931, 932 (1999). 
 305.  See John Louis, Infinite Money and Infrastructural Power: Analyzing the Fiscal 
Determinants of English State Building, 1689–1789, 5 JOSEF KORBEL J. OF ADVANCED INT’L STUD. 
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terminate war pursuant to its purse power,306 some scholars argue that 
Congress’s constitutional role in war termination is broader and more 
nuanced than merely determining whether funds may be drawn from the 
treasury to continue fighting a war.307  Not only—these scholars argue—can 
Congress check the President’s war powers by attaching conditions to 
appropriations bills, but the Appropriations Clause explicitly grants 
Congress the power to control all spending from the federal Treasury.308   
The appropriations power is a well-established congressional means of 
ending war and an essential check on executive power, but the exercise of 
the purse power as a war termination power may not foster genuine 
cooperation between Congress and the President in terminating war.309  
Accordingly, under certain circumstances, it would be more conducive of 
interbranch collaboration—and would be more consistent with the Framers’ 
division of the treaty-making power and the separation of powers principles 
underpinning the American constitutional system—for Congress to engage 
with the President through the exercise of the treaty-making power.   
 
59, 59 (2013) (quoting Cicero) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 306.  Many scholars argue that Congress could use its appropriations power to terminate a war by 
defunding it.  Tiefer, supra note 194, at 293 (2006) (arguing that Congress can significantly regulate 
wars through appropriations bills).  See generally Fisher, supra note 165; J. Gregory Sidak, The 
President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162 (1989) (arguing that Congress cannot 
significantly regulate wars through appropriations bills).  The theories underlying Tiefer’s article 
have not been criticized in scholarly literature.  He was cited for his discussion of both sides of the 
debate on whether Congress can order a withdrawal from a war in Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, 
The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 302 (2008).  The 
citation of Sidak’s aggressive theory of independent presidential power under the constitution is very 
mixed.  For example, Sidak has been cited as an example of a proponent of unitary presidential 
power in multiple articles.  Accord Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary 
Executive During The First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1453, 1455 (1997).  His 
theory is discussed favorably in part in Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on the Use of 
Appropriations Riders by Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes, 19 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 457 (1992).  However, Sidak’s theory has been heavily criticized in Peter Raven-Hansen & 
William C. Banks, From Vietnam to Desert Shield: The Commander in Chief’s Spending Power, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 79, 130–32 (1995). 
 307.  See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 210, at 74 (noting that Congress determines “how much 
money the President shall have to spend on the armed forces under his command”); see also BANKS 
& RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 163, at 171 (“[T]he power of the purse is different in national 
security than in domestic affairs, evolving as an intended counterweight to the president’s national 
security power.”). 
 308.  See supra note 308.  
 309.  See Michael J. Glennon, Process Versus Policy in Foreign Relations: Foreign Affairs and 
the United States Constitution, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1542, 1547 (1997) (summarizing and critiquing 
Henkin’s assessment of the appropriation dilemma between Congress and the President). 
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Some scholars—such as William Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen—raise 
constitutional concerns that congressional funding cut-offs could leave the 
U.S. with inadequate financial resources to fight an ongoing war, and 
thereby, significantly impede the ability of the Commander in Chief to carry 
out his job.310  They debate whether Congress can insert conditions into 
defense appropriations bills that would effectively terminate the President’s 
ability to conduct a war.311  Other scholars argue Congress has broad 
authority to limit wars through appropriations riders or supplemental 
amendments that could limit the President’s war termination options.312  
Such appropriations measures might provide funds for an air campaign, but 
 
 310.  See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 163, at 150 (contending that interpreting the 
Boland Amendment to restrict U.S. funding of the Contras in Nicaragua as applying, even if the 
Sandinistas executed an armed attack on U.S. citizens or the U.S. embassy, would “intrude[] deeply 
into the oft-claimed and generally recognized constitutional power of the president to defend and 
protect Americans against attack.”). 
 311.  See id. at 181; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: 
An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 552 (1999) (“The doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is clear; its application in [the area of foreign relations] (as in other areas 
of constitutional law), however, frequently is not.  It is often unclear whether to interpret a 
conditional spending provision as a legislative assumption of authority the Constitution grants to the 
President, or as the legitimate use of a congressional power to express congressional views on 
foreign policy, or even to accomplish other proper legislative goals, in a manner that affects, without 
usurping, presidential authority.”). 
 312.  Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a 
Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1998) (“[A]n independent presidential 
spending authority is inconsistent with the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Constitution’s 
Framers, and the country’s experience under the Constitution.”); see also Kate Stith, Congress’ 
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349 (1988) (“[E]ven if there were no appropriations clause 
in the Constitution, Congress would have the power to enact a statutory ‘appropriations clause,’ 
worded exactly the same as the clause in article I, section 9, making Congress’ appropriations power 
exclusive.  If Congress could not prohibit the Executive from withdrawing funds from the Treasury, 
then the constitutional grants of power to the legislature to raise taxes and to borrow money would 
be for naught because the Executive could effectively compel such legislation by spending at will.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  Kate Stith discusses an appropriations bill that banned military operations in 
Cambodia during the Vietnam War: “By such appropriations legislation, Congress decides that, 
under our constitutional scheme, for the duration of the appropriations denial, the specific activity is 
no longer within the realm of authorized government actions.”  Stith, at 1361.  “All appropriations 
thus may be conceived of as lump-sum grants with ‘strings’ attached.  These strings, or conditions of 
expenditure, constitute legislative prescriptions that bind the operating arm of government.”  Id. at 
1353.  This last quote is not specifically talking about appropriations that deal with war termination.  
See id.; cf. Tiefer, supra note 306, at 342.  “A preclusive reading of the Commander in Chief Clause 
also fails to grapple with the fact that the text of Article I is rife with express references to the 
congressional role with respect to the army, navy, and militia, including specific war powers.”  
Barron & Lederman, supra note 46, at 771.  These authors discuss spending on military operations.  
See id. at 739–40. 
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withhold them from a ground campaign, effectively forcing the President to 
reject the use of ground troops during a particular campaign.  Yet other 
scholars argue that historical examples of appropriations conditions featured 
unconstitutional limits on the President’s Commander in Chief power, 
contending that the Constitution grants the President some independent war 
powers.313  A minority of these scholars claim that the President has the 
power to spend money in wartime without congressional appropriations.314  
They argue that, in exceptional cases the President’s constitutional duty as 
Commander in Chief not to leave U.S. citizens marooned in hostile territory 
could trump conditions in an appropriations bill explicitly prohibiting the 
 
 313.  Sidak, supra note 306, at 1170–71; see e.g,. JOHN N. MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA 
WAR 566 (1970); George H. Aldrich, Comments on the Articles on the Legality of the United States 
Action in Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 79–80 (1971); Powell, supra note 311, at 552–54 (citing 
William H. Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches 
of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 612 (1916)); William H. Rehnquist, The Constitutional 
Issues—Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 638 (1970) (arguing area restrictions on the 
Vietnam War could not stop the President from ordering operations in Cambodia). 
  One could also argue that appropriations conditions that severely limit the President’s ability 
to prosecute a war are unconstitutional spending conditions.  See David B. Rivkin, Jr., & Lee A. 
Casey, What Congress Can (and Can’t) Do on Iraq, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2007), 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/15/AR2007011500970.html.  One could 
also make functionalist arguments to support independent presidential authority war powers.  Id.  
Scholars also argue that the President should have full control of the military during a war because 
the President has superior information and the ability to act secretly and quickly.  Robert F. Turner, 
Separation of Powers in Foreign Policy: The Theoretical Underpinnings, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. 
REV. 97, 98–101 (1988) (discussing the theoretical and policy underpinnings for putting the 
executive power in the hands of the President).  As Justice Sutherland stated, the President, “has the 
better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is 
this true in time of war.  He has his confidential sources of information.”  United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).  Defenders of unilateral presidential power stress the 
expansive reasoning in the controversial Curtiss-Wright case—in which the court stated “‘[t]he 
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with 
foreign nations.”  Id. at 319 (citations omitted).  This is a highly controversial case from 1936 and 
involved the court’s analysis of a statute that barred arms sales to South American countries.  Id. at 
311.  The reasoning and dicta of the case stress that the unitary nature of the President seemed to go 
much further than necessary to justify the Court’s opinion.  See also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE 
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984 201 (5th rev. ed. 1984). 
 314.  See Sidak, supra note 306 at 1163 (“[T]he President, without violating the Constitution or 
statutory law, may obligate the Treasury provided that Congress has failed to appropriate the 
minimum amount necessary for him to perform the duties and exercise the prerogatives given him 
by article II of the Constitution.”); see also Powell, supra note 311, at 573 (“The exclusive character 
of the President’s operational control over the military rests on the assumption, embedded in the 
Constitution as it has been interpreted, that military success can depend on a clear, unified chain of 
command. . . . Congress therefore has no power to direct the President in the planning or execution 
of lawful missions, and it may not lawfully interfere with the President’s decisions about which 
military units to employ.”).   
[Vol. 41: 685, 2014] Ending Perpetual War? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
743 
President from using force to conduct rescue operations.315 
During the Vietnam War, Congress influenced the President’s foreign 
policy with respect to Vietnam by attaching certain conditions and 
restrictions to essential bills that provided funding for armed operations 
abroad.316  In the 1970s, Congress debated two bills that would have barred 
the use of appropriated funds to support the armed forces in Vietnam and 
Cambodia, and eventually passed seven bills prohibiting the use of 
appropriated funds to support U.S. forces in Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos 
(subsequent presidential uses of force in those areas were restricted to 
controversial rescue operations).317  Some scholars argue that Congress 
merely appeared to authorize implicitly the use of force in Cambodia when 
(after President Nixon vetoed an initial appropriations bill) Congress 
compromised by delaying the cut-off of funding for military operations in 
the bill318 by forty-five days.319  The Second Circuit found that the law 
constituted authorization for the continued bombing of Cambodia until the 
cut-off date.320  Skeptical of this conclusion, other scholars identify 
functional concerns—such as domestic political factors or Congress’s 
limited ability to respond swiftly—that prevent Congress from using its 
purse power to terminate war once U.S. forces have been introduced into 
hostilities.321 
 
 315.  KOH, supra note 154, at 52–53.   
 316.  See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 163, at 173. 
 317.  See KOH, supra note 154, at 52–53.  Although Congress did not declare war in connection 
with the use of force in Vietnam and Cambodia, the Second Circuit held that the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution (which was subsequently appealed) and ongoing congressional appropriations for 
military assets in Southeast Asia were sufficient to authorize the President’s use of military force.  
See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–43 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that “[b]oth branches 
collaborated in the endeavor, and neither could long maintain such a war without the concurrence 
and cooperation of the other”); Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) 
(repealed 1971) (authorizing the President “to take all necessary measures” towards these objectives 
“as the President determines”). 
 318.  Joint Resolution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-52, 87 Stat. 130 
(1973). 
 319.  See Fisher, supra note 165, at 116 (“A revised bill delayed the cutoff of funds from June 30 
to August 15, 1973, in effect giving the President freedom to bomb Cambodia for another forty-five 
days—which is what he did.”); see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 46, at 1065–67 (describing 
the congressional reaction to learning of the Cambodian military operations); Edwin B. Firmage, The 
War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 65, 89–91 (1977) (same). 
 320.  Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[W]e cannot see how this 
provision does not support the proposition that the Congress has approved the Cambodian 
bombing.”). 
 321.  ELY, supra note 159, at 29; Neal Katyal, Executive Decision, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2006), 
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Within the constitutional system of checks and balances, the power of 
the purse is an important check on the President’s Commander in Chief 
power,322 and Congress could use the purse power to effectuate the end of a 
war.323  Even scholars, who argue the Declare War Clause grants Congress 
no role in war authorization, still believe that Congress’s power of the purse 
is a check on the President in war making, and a vehicle through which 
Congress can end a war.324  
After some debate at the Constitutional Convention, the Founders 
decided against granting Congress the power to declare peace—suggesting 
that the Framers did not want Congress to be able to terminate a war without 
the President’s consent, or even that they wanted the President to have the 
exclusive power to terminate wars.325  Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 74 
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/05/AR2006010501653.html 
(reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005)).  In addition, it is impossible for Congress to defund the many quick 
strike actions that Presidents have taken in recent decades (e.g., Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 
1989) that are over before Congress has time to pass legislation.  See Tung Yin, Structural 
Objections to the Inherent Commander-in-Chief Power Thesis, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 965, 976–77 (2007). 
 322.  Barron & Lederman, supra note 46, at 802–03.  See generally ELY, supra note 159; Charles 
A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672 
(1972).  Chief Justice John Marshall stated “The whole powers of war being, by the [C]onstitution of 
the United States, vested in [C]ongress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides.”  
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801). 
 323.  Barron & Lederman, supra note 46, at 740. 
 324.  “Congress certainly has the constitutional power to end U.S. military operations by refusing 
to appropriate the necessary funding.  This was designed to be an important check given to the 
Congress by the Constitution.”  Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of 
the Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 
974  (1994).  “If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war or disagrees with the 
president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually.”  John Yoo, The 
Presidential Power Argument, in BATTLEGROUND: WAR POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 3, 6 
(2011); see also John Yoo, War Powers Belong to the President, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president (“Congress’ 
check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military.  It can also block any 
immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse.  If Congress feels it has been misled in 
authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either 
all at once or gradually.”). 
 325.  See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 216, at 684 (Gouverneur Morris argued “that no peace ought 
to be made without the concurrence of the President, who was the general guardian of the national 
interests” and therefore there ought to be no separate congressional peace power outside of the treaty 
process.); see also Heder, supra note 7, at 454–55 (arguing that “[t]hough ultimately inconclusive, 
the historical evidence suggests the Framers did not prefer Congress to have powers to terminate or 
limit a war above and beyond what the Constitution explicitly gives it.”).  See generally VILE, supra 
note 260.  Heder argues:  
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that, “[o]f all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power 
by a single hand.”326  Hamilton also posited in Federalist No. 71 that if the 
presidential war powers were, “constituted as to be at the absolute devotion 
of the legislative,” the separation of powers which granted declarations of 
war to Congress and control of the military to the President would be 
“merely nominal, and incapable of producing the ends for which it was 
established.”327   
Additionally, key differences between the Articles of Confederation and 
the Constitution support the contention that congressional interference with 
the conduct of war by setting conditions on defense appropriations bills is 
unconstitutional.328  Article IX of the Articles of Confederation assigned to 
Congress the responsibility for “making rules for the government and 
regulation of the . . . land and naval forces, and directing their operations.”329  
Article I, section 8, of the Constitution is nearly identical, except it omits the 
phrase “directing their operations.”330  Consequently, Congress should not 
subvert the Framers’ design by regulating ongoing military operations 
through appropriations or other means.331  This argument relates to one of 
the major reasons the Articles of Confederation were discarded by the 
founding generation—the founders thought the Articles made a critical error 
in giving the legislature too much control over military operations.332  
 
While the Framers gave Congress the appropriation power to effectively terminate a war, 
they did not take the additional step and give Congress the explicit authority to statutorily 
(or otherwise) terminate a war.  The logical inference is that if the Framers purposely 
provided no specific guidance in the Constitution on a point, then subsequent 
disagreements about that point ought to be resolved by appeal to channels other than the 
Constitution.  Thus, in choosing not to explicitly grant this power in the Constitution, the 
Framers preferred complex questions surrounding the termination of a war to be resolved 
politically rather than through appeal to the Constitution. 
Heder, supra note 7, at 455. 
 326.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 327.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).  
 328.  Fisher, supra note 165, at 109.  
 329.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 4. 
 330.  Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 4, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 14. 
 331.  Barron & Lederman, supra note 46, at 788. 
 332.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Even those [states] which have, in 
other respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for the most part concentrated the 
military authority in him alone.  Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war 
most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.  
The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and 
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Although there is general agreement that Congress has broad powers 
under the Appropriations Clause, courts have not played a significant role in 
determining the degree to which Congress can use its power of the purse to 
terminate war.333  Over the second half of the twentieth century, there were a 
variety of conditions inserted into appropriations bills that attempted to 
restrain the President, and either end wars completely or confine the 
geographic area of a war.334  Notably, the Court has never directly addressed 
the legal questions of when an appropriations restraint on the President’s war 
making ability is unconstitutional or whether Congress can preemptively 
defund a war.335   
In the absence of definitive Supreme Court precedent on this issue, it is 
important to consider the text and structure of the Constitution, as well as 
historical practice.  Several legal theories have been proposed to deal with 
 
employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive 
authority.”). 
 333.  Accord Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C.C. 2000) (refusing to decide on the 
merits of whether Congress can use its power of the purse to terminate war). 
 334.  Examples include restrictions put on military operations during the Vietnam War.  See, e.g., 
Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-126, § 13, 87 Stat. 451 
(1973); Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 93-124, § 1, 87 Stat. 449 (1973); Continuing 
Appropriations Resolution of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-52 § 108, 87 Stat. 130 (1973); Fulbright 
Amendment to Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50 § 307, 87 Stat. 
99; Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-652, § 7, 84 Stat. 1942.  The 1991 
AUMF for the Persian Gulf War limited the purpose of the war to expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, as 
opposed to a full invasion of Iraq to overthrow the Hussein regime.  Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991).  Also, in 1993, 
Congress placed a time limit on the use of military force in Somalia—unless the President requested 
an extension.  See Presidential Powers—Hostilities and War Powers: Letter from Caroline D. Krass 
to Eric H. Holder, Jr., 1 PUB. L. MISC. 260, 273 (2011). 
 335.  For one of the most recent examples of courts refusing to decide the merits of this legal 
issue, see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C.C. 2000), which dismissed a suit by 
Congressmen to enjoin the war against Yugoslavia due to lack of standing.  See also Raven-Hansen 
& Banks, supra note 294, at 838 (discussing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)).  Courts 
often rule that Congressmen, service members, and other actors who attempt to bring civil actions to 
stop wars lack standing to bring a civil action because they do not have a concrete injury.  See, e.g., 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (holding that Congressmen only have standing when they have 
a personal injury—for example being stopped from entering the legislature, or when their votes have 
been nullified).  Standing requires a concrete injury that is traceable to the conduct of the defendant 
and redressable by the courts.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (leading 
case on requirements of standing).  Courts also often refuse to hear constitutional war powers 
questions because they believe the legal question is a non-justiciable political question.  See supra 
note 203.  In regards to political questions, courts have a desire to avoid international embarrassment 
of elected officials and often believe that there is a lack of judicially discoverable standards to 
answer the legal question.  See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961) (leading case on 
political question doctrine). 
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the complex constitutional problem of appropriations conditions that limit 
the presidential war power.336  Two leading scholars have proposed 
theoretical legal frameworks to analyze defense appropriations restraints.337  
Other scholars base their analysis on cases that focus on congressional-
presidential conflicts more broadly,338 and attempt to analogize these cases to 
appropriations bills that restrict presidential war making.339  The explanatory 
 
 336.  See, e.g., RAVEN-HANSEN & BANKS, supra note 163, at 146. 
 337.  See id.  Two leading appropriations scholars have argued that one must balance “the extent 
to which the restriction prevents [the President] from accomplishing . . . constitutionally assigned 
functions against the need for the same restriction to promote objectives within the authority of 
Congress.”  Id. at 160.  Raven-Hansen and Banks argue that Congress, in addition to having the 
power to completely defund a war, can also enact substantial restrictions on military operations 
through appropriations.  See id. at 147–48 (citing Connie Ferguson Bryan, Limiting the Use of Funds 
Appropriated for Executive Functions: Is the 1984 Boland Amendment Constitutional?, 13 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 569, 595–96 (1988)).  They consider the restrictions from the Vietnam War and the 
Boland Amendments constitutional restrictions on war making.  See RAVEN-HANSEN & BANKS, 
supra note 163, at 147–48; see also LeBoeuf, supra note 306, at 481 (1992)).  Raven-Hansen agrees 
with the traditional argument that Congress could completely defund a war and this would 
effectively end the President’s ability to fund a war.  See RAVEN-HANSEN & BANKS, supra note 163, 
at 172.  However, Raven-Hansen specifically noted that there may be emergency situations where 
the President might have to spend money without previous appropriations.  See id.  Raven-Hansen is 
really only referring to extreme emergencies that require immediate defensive action, when he 
discusses presidential spending without congressional appropriations.  See id. at 166–68, 172.  
Raven-Hansen is extremely critical of theories that Presidents can spend money on wars in the face 
of a Congressional ban on this spending.  See id.  Additionally, in the context of appropriations 
conditions (not complete defunding), Raven-Hansen noted that some argue there is an inherent 
presidential spending authority.  See id. at 166–68.  This inherent spending authority would allow the 
President to “‘encumber the treasury for the minimum amount reasonably necessary for him to 
perform his constitutional duties.’”  Id. at 166 (quoting Sidak, supra note 306, at 1242–43).   
 338.  The Lovett case stands for the proposition that “the power of the purse may not be 
constitutionally exercised to produce an unconstitutional result such as . . . a trespass upon the 
constitutional functions of another branch of the Government.”  RAVEN-HANSEN & BANKS, supra 
note 163, at 144–45 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Lovett involved a bill of attainder attached to an appropriations bill, and not restrictions on the 
President’s war powers.  Id. at 145.  It also did not explicitly focus on the limits of the appropriations 
power.  Id.  Lovett precedential value is thus limited.  But one can use the Court’s statement on 
congressional power as a basis for arguments by analogy in the war powers context.  See id. at 146–
48; Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 294, at 885 (discussing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
303 (1946)).  Any attempt to extend the Lovett standard—which did not deal specifically with limits 
of the Appropriations Clause power—to the war powers context necessarily involves a debate about 
the President’s powers under the Commander in Chief Clause and which of these powers cannot be 
regulated by Congress.  One must determine what powers are the core Commander in Chief powers 
that can never be regulated by Congress in order to analyze a specific congressional action that is 
short of a full defunding of a war. 
 339.  Because there is no Court precedent on wartime appropriations bills, leading scholars also 
refer by analogy to other important separation of powers cases.  The broad standard to judge 
congressional regulation of the executive branch was elaborated on in Morrison v. Olson when the 
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value of these cases is limited in that they do not specifically address either 
the appropriations power or ongoing military operations.340  Congress has 
inserted numerous conditions into appropriations bills in the past forty years 
in attempts to limit or terminate U.S. military action in specific military 
operations.341   
C.  Endangering Equilibrium 
1.  Rivalry and Escalation 
Competitive aggrandizement by the political branches encourages the 
use of unilateral and potentially disruptive methods of war termination.  
Disagreements between the political branches are a common feature of the 
American political process, and often spark a robust dialogue that raises the 
specter of war termination in the national consciousness.  But the use of 
constitutionally disproportionate and unilateral means should not serve as a 
substitute for the persuasion that ought to prevail in the resolution of 
interbranch disputes—especially in the sphere of foreign relations, in which 
such domestic constitutional disputes can lead to confusion among allies and 
partners concerning sensitive matters of national security.  Congressional 
aggrandizement may be the path of least political friction, and terminating a 
particular war might in fact be in the nation’s best interest.  But political 
expediency is not the linchpin of constitutional separation of powers, and 
can be counterproductive in the war termination process.342 
Congress lacks the explicit constitutional power to declare peace, and 
 
court stated congressional action does not violate the separation of powers if it does not 
“impermissibly undermine the powers of the Executive Branch, or . . . prevent[] the Executive 
Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, 658 (1988).  A concurrence in the Public Citizen case also stated that “we would invalidate the 
statute only if the potential for disruption of the President’s constitutional functions were present and 
if ‘that impact were not justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the 
constitutional authority of Congress.’”  Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 485 
(1989) (quoting Nixon v. Admin’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
 340.  See cases cited supra note 339. 
 341.   See Fisher, supra note 165, at 111–12 (The historical examples include congressional 
actions which banned military operations in Vietnam and sending assistance to anti-Communist 
forces in Nicaragua in the 1980s.); see also supra Part 2.A.3.a; supra note 334. 
 342.  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is 
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save 
it if it is contrary to the Constitution.  Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or 
the hallmarks—of democratic government.”). 
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this power was intentionally left out of the Constitution’s text by the 
Framers, at least in part, to ensure that the President—as the representative 
of the nation in foreign affairs—maintains the central role in the war 
termination process.343  This is not to say that Congress may not use its 
appropriations power to limit or control the scope of a war, because it has 
the power to define the scope of a conflict through the declare war clause; 
instead, it is to say that Congress should not use the appropriations power as 
a substitute for a power to declare peace.344  Though some scholars have 
treated the past use of appropriations riders to terminate wars as a gloss on 
constitutional authority,345 mere repeated practice does not mean that such 
legislative war termination measures are constitutionally sacrosanct.346 
The circumstances surrounding the Vietnam War, for example, meant 
that the President and Congress were at odds over the continued operation of 
U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, and at various points relied primarily on the 
use of independent constitutional war powers.  Even though the use of 
military force against North Vietnam was initially authorized by Congress, 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was eventually withdrawn.347  Moreover, the 
President initially directed the use of military force in Cambodia without 
congressional knowledge or consent.348  Because Congress was unable to 
effectuate an end to this conflict by repealing its prior authorization or by 
restricting the scope of authorized hostilities, it resorted to the use of an 
indirect, but highly potent, constitutional means of terminating those wars: 
the appropriations power.349  Notwithstanding the important U.S. national 
 
 343.  Heder, supra note 7, at 454–55. 
 344.  For instance, Congress may not use the appropriations power to effectively pass an 
unconstitutional bill of attainder, nor may it use it to trespass on the constitutional functions of a 
coordinate branch of government.  Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142, 152 (1945) (Madden, J., 
concurring).  The Supreme Court criticized this decision for reaching a constitutional issue when 
unnecessary.  See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).  After the factual situation changed, 
however, a lower federal court held that Congress may not use its appropriations power in order to 
restrain the President’s Commander in Chief authority to control the classification of documents 
because it impermissibly intrudes on his constitutional prerogatives.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. 
v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 685 (1988). 
 345.  See generally BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 163, at 121–22. 
 346.  See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944 (noting that repeated longstanding practice of an 
unconstitutional nature sharpens, rather than blunts, constitutional concerns). 
 347.  119 CONG. REC. 15,307 (1973). 
 348.  BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 163, at 121–22. 
 349.  Id. at 154–55; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93D CONG., CONGRESS AND THE TERMINATION OF 
THE VIETNAM WAR (Comm. Print 1973) (discussing ways in which Congress might effectuate its 
will to end wars even when the President ignores a withdrawal of authorization). 
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interests that may motivate congressional attempts to check presidential 
power, efforts to check such executive authority should be undertaken 
judiciously.350 
It is also worth noting that although the War Powers Resolution (enacted 
in the aftermath of Vietnam) requires congressional authorization for a war 
that exceeds the sixty-day—or in some cases, ninety-day—time period 
during which the President may direct the use of military force, Congress 
has not used the War Powers Resolution as a mechanism for terminating 
war.351 
When Congress attempts to assume full control of war authorization and 
termination, it jeopardizes the structural balance between the branches, 
especially with respect to the exercise of constitutional war powers.  Some 
scholars argue, for example, that if Congress were to deny funds for a 
military action preemptively or cut funding during an ongoing operation, it 
would unconstitutionally undermine this interdependent relationship 
between the political branches.352   
 
 350.  See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (“The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate 
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be 
resisted.”); see also Bowsher v.Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (“The dangers of congressional 
usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized.”).  
 351.  War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2012)); see also RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS20775, CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970 INVOLVING U.S. 
MILITARY FORCES AND OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS 3 (2007) (“Since its enactment in 1973, there is 
no specific instance when the Congress has successfully utilized the War Powers Resolution to 
compel the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from foreign deployments against the President’s 
will.”). 
 352.  There are also functionalist policy arguments one can make to support the independent 
powers of the President.  The President has control over tactical strategy as the Commander in Chief, 
and Congress forcing the President to withdraw troops by a deadline arguably infringes upon the 
President’s power to control tactics and engage in an orderly withdrawal.  If Congress has authorized 
a war, the President needs a practical amount of time to finish the war and withdraw troops.  The 
concurrent authority in the zone of twilight allows the President this discretion.  Heder, supra note 7, 
at 465 (noting that “times of retrograde require the specific expertise of the Commander in Chief.  
When Congress attempts to limit or rearrange troop numbers or redefine troops’ mission mid-war, it 
interferes with the Commander in Chief’s discretion.”).  These functionalist arguments would 
receive a strong rebuke from Congress.  See, e.g., Robert C. Byrd, The Constitution, the Congress, 
and the Use of Military Force, 2 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 37 (1995); Abner J. Mikva, Congress: The 
Purse, the Purpose, and the Power, 21 GA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1986) (“In 1974 and again in 1975, 
Congress refused to appropriate the more than one-half billion dollars requested by the President to 
continue the war effort.  The denial effectively forced the cessation of hostilities; Congress had 
seized the initiative in exactly the manner contemplated by the founders.  Had Congress not 
possessed this plenary power—had the President retained any authority to raise, appropriate, or 
divert funds—this catastrophic war would certainly have continued.”). 
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Notwithstanding the challenge of identifying a limiting principle or 
doctrine to mediate such interbranch conflict, equilibrium does not have to 
mean that the assumption of unilateral presidential authority may only be 
checked by an assumption of unilateral congressional authority.  
Unquestionably, wars can and have been ended by the denial of funds, but 
the utility of a congressional action is not a gloss on its constitutionality.353  
If left unchecked, the use of the appropriations power to induce presidential 
action to end war can amount to an assumption of power beyond what the 
Constitution grants to Congress.354 
2.  Provocative Unilateralism 
Unilateral executive action can provoke an unnecessary interbranch 
rivalry in the war termination process.  Presidential aggrandizement can lead 
to the congressional misuse of the appropriations power in order to induce 
executive action to end military operations.  In other words, provocation 
creates an escalatory dynamic between the two political branches, and this 
dynamic can lead to an unconstitutional imbalance of power.  This 
congressional inducement can also serve as a tool of political persuasion in 
the broader campaign to end the war in a concerted fashion.355  Relying on 
such aggrandizing means to bridge the divide between the branches at a 
political impasse tends to encourage more of the same; it is possible to 
imagine a political situation that is the reverse from that in Vietnam, where 
the President sought, instead, to influence Congress to end a war by simply 
refusing to commit any forces to the conflict.  In such a situation, the 
President may have been abusing his constitutional war powers in order to 
circumvent the congressional power to declare war. 
Regardless of whether protracted interbranch conflict may render 
attractive constitutionally questionable uses of power, unilateral assumptions 
of authority that accomplish short-term political goals risk escalating 
interbranch rivalry and causing aggrandizement, inter-branch animus, and 
the unsustainable arrogation of authority in the long-term.  In an extreme 
case—though Congress successfully used appropriations riders to end U.S. 
 
 353.  See generally BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 163, at 121–22. 
 354.  See generally Rosen, supra note 312 (examining the independent presidential spending 
power, whether it is sustainable in light of the Constitution’s text, the intent of the Constitution’s 
Founders, the body of custom developed under the Constitution, and the decisions of the courts). 
 355.  Heder, supra note 7, at 453–54. 
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operations in Cambodia—the President undertook certain legislative actions 
as a ratification of executive authority to engage in operations without 
explicit congressional authorization under the theory that Congress has the 
constitutional power simply to defund any operations of which it 
disapproves.356  As a result, Congress was able to implement its immediate 
policy goal, but escalated the constitutional confrontation with the Executive 
over future war termination issues. 
3.  Undue Interference 
Interbranch rivalry and aggrandizement can interfere unduly with the 
war termination process.  Justice Jackson cautioned that the Constitution 
“enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity.”357  Moreover, the Founders intended that the treaty-making 
power involve both the President and the Senate because of the important 
interests at stake.358  If one branch of government rushes to enact a peace 
without the concurrence of the other political branch, it puts its political 
goals ahead of the constitutional mechanism for ensuring that decisions of 
peace and war are treated with the proper gravity.  The legal encumbrances 
on the termination of war serve the policy goals of ensuring that peace is 
entered into without due consideration. 
There are practical implications associated with unilateral moves by one 
political branch to terminate a war.  In particular, the aggrandizement of war 
termination powers by one political branch can lead to recklessness in the 
war termination process.  If successful, a conflict may end up being 
terminated at an undesirable juncture: the judgment of the branch that is 
more successful in mobilizing political power is not necessarily the best 
judgment.  If unsuccessful, branches will have antagonized each other 
without having accomplished the goal of terminating the particular war.   
 
 356.  See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 163, at 147 (discussing the arguments of the 
Reagan and Bush administrations that the actual congressional check on presidential war-making 
was not the Declare War Clause, but the appropriations power). 
 357.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 358.  MADISON, supra note 4, at 524. 
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D.  Concurrence and Interdependence  
1.  Structural Restraint 
Promoting concurrent action by the political branches ensures a more 
transparent and accountable war termination decision-making process.  Two 
constitutional methods of legally ending a state of war—the ratification of a 
peace treaty and a congressional joint resolution accompanied by a 
Presidential proclamation—both require the participation of more than one 
branch of government.  One of the reasons that the Founders required the 
participation of both the Senate and the President in ratifying treaties was to 
ensure that treaty commitments would not be undertaken without due 
consideration, particularly if these treaties were peace treaties.359  Similarly, 
the process of bicameral presentment (a prerequisite of a congressional joint 
resolution) combined with a separate Presidential proclamation ensures that 
the expertise of both political branches may be brought to bear.360  Indeed, a 
joint resolution establishing peace would actually require the participation of 
the House of Representatives, as well as, the Senate and the President—
eliminating the need for a senatorial supermajority, but requiring the 
participation of both houses of Congress.361 
Though George Mason preferred to clog war rather than peace, the 
Founders acknowledged that peace terms had to be carefully considered.362  
The participation of both political branches may make war termination more 
of a slog, but this constitutional process has the benefit of encouraging both 
political branches to make decisions openly and with greater regard for the 
implications of such determinations.  Moreover, it is not clear that unilateral 
branch action is any swifter in reality—the Vietnam War took years to end 
despite congressional assertions of power. 
 
 359.  See MADISON, supra note 4, at 524–26.  The Founders rejected a proposal by Madison to 
allow two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a peace treaty without the President, as Governor Morris 
argued that “no peace ought to be made without the concurrence of the President, who was the 
general guardian of the national interests.”  Id. 
 360.  An appropriations bill is also presented to the President bicamerally, but the requirement of a 
presidential proclamation preserves executive participation in terminating war because an 
appropriations bill may still reflect unilateral congressional action if such legislation survives a 
presidential veto.  See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 361.  Joint Resolution, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/joint_ 
resolution.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 362.  See Mosier, supra note 52, at 1614, 1635. 
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2.  Clear Statement Requirements 
Reading appropriations riders defunding a war together with biennial 
and other ongoing war appropriations, which the Office of Legal Counsel 
has construed as tacit congressional authorization for the use of force,363 can 
lead to confusion regarding congressional intent to end a war.  In contrast to 
situations where concurrent presidential authority allows for congressional 
silence to indicate acquiescence, a clear statement of congressional intent to 
accord powers to the executive is preferable when the President seeks to go 
beyond what his constitutional powers have traditionally allowed.364  When 
constitutional prohibitions are not at issue, independent or concurrent 
presidential authority can be manifested without the need for any clear 
statement by Congress.365  Courts have generally insisted on such clear 
statements, however, when presidential constitutional authority implicates 
express constitutional protections in order to avoid knotty constitutional 
issues.366   
3.  Mutuality and Concord 
a.  Preserving Branch Prerogatives 
The two-branch methods of war termination not only preserve the 
constitutional vision of the Founders, where no one branch could terminate a 
war, but also preserve the prerogatives of each political branch.367  Unilateral 
 
 363.  See sources cited supra note 27. 
 364.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 68, at 2103–05. 
 365.  See, e.g., Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. 164, 189–90 (1853) (recognizing that the President may 
occupy territory, and regulate import duties and tariffs in such territory during wartime under the 
commander in chief power, absent a congressional act authorizing such an extension because no 
constitutional liberty interests were at stake).  Compare Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27–29, 44 
(1942) (holding that because the right to a jury trial does not apply to captured combatants, 
congressional authorization for military commissions for American servicemen, who violate the laws 
of war, can be read alongside the general wartime authority of the Commander in Chief to capture 
enemy combatants in a way to imply the power to try enemy combatants under military 
commissions) with Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 299–300 (1944) (holding that Fifth and 
Sixth amendment protections for civilian U.S. citizens counsel against an inference of executive 
authority to detain during wartime outside a clear congressional statement). 
 366.  See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (declining to construe the Executive’s 
constitutionally implied power of diplomatic protection far enough to limit the Fifth Amendment 
liberty right of a passport bearer to enter and exit at will, absent a clear congressional grant). 
 367.  See generally Mosier, supra note 52, at 1613–14. 
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congressional war termination measures infringe on the President’s powers 
as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, as well as the foreign relations 
power.  Similarly, unilateral presidential war termination may undercut 
Congress’s power to declare and fund war.  Unilateral termination by either 
branch burdens the other branch’s role in the treaty-making process called 
for in Articles I and II of the Constitution.  The Constitution did not grant 
either branch complete power over war and peace, and the unilateral 
arrogation of such a power by either branch for political expediency 
necessarily diminishes the constitutional role of the other branch as a partner 
in government. 
Mutual action by the branches to end a war, whether by treaty or by 
joint resolution accompanied by a proclamation, ensures that each branch 
consents to the termination of hostilities.  Not only do these processes allow 
for deliberation and careful assessment of weighty issues of war and peace, 
but they preserve the allocation of powers between the branches.  A peace 
treaty concluded to end a war does not burden the President’s foreign 
relations power because he negotiated it, and it does not burden Congress’s 
declare war power because the Senate consented to it.  
b.  Deference to the Political Branches and Political Cover 
Supreme Court case law suggests that the Court will not be the final 
arbiter of the constitutional allocation of the power to terminate wars.368  The 
Court is often reluctant to answer the question of whether a war has ended in 
light of the political question doctrine,369 and lower courts generally rely on 
 
 368.  See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 369.  See supra note 222.  The political question doctrine has most recently been summarized by 
the Court as a bar to judicial review of “a controversy . . . where there is a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”  Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 
132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A long line of 
cases shows the Court’s hesitance in foreign affairs.  Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“Such decisions [of foreign policy] are wholly confided by our 
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative.  They are 
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.  They are and should be undertaken only 
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil . . . and have long 
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”); 
see cases cited supra note 289; see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring) (“I am of the view that the basic question presented by the petitioners in this case is 
‘political’ and therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the 
conduct of our country’s foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is 
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the actions of the political braches when the question of the state of war is 
germane to the settlement of a private legal dispute.370  Typically, the cases, 
where the termination of war is discussed, do not involve direct disputes 
between the President and Congress, and are usually matters of statutory 
construction.  Because a constitutional clash between the President and 
Congress over the termination of a war is not likely to be an issue necessary 
for resolution in a private suit,371 the question of whether one political branch 
may unilaterally end a war will almost certainly not be decided by the 
judiciary.372  It is up to each political branch, then, to protect its prerogatives 
in war termination. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR TERMINATION OF THE WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA AND 
ASSOCIATED FORCES 
This Part applies the framework discussed in Part IV to one question 
that would arise if the armed conflict with Al Qaeda and associated forces 
were to come to an end: As a constitutional matter, which branch of the 
federal government has the final say over whether a war has ended?   
Considering that a war’s legal contours under domestic and international 
law may not be coterminous, how one determines when the legal condition 
 
authorized to negate the action of the President.”).  Notably, Rehnquist said that the Court ought to 
be especially wary of rendering a constitutional holding on a matter about which the Constitution is 
silent.  Id. at 1003 (“I believe it follows a fortiori from Coleman that the controversy in the instant 
case is a nonjusticiable political dispute that should be left for resolution by the Executive and 
Legislative Branches of the Government.  Here, while the Constitution is express as to the manner in 
which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty, it is silent as to that body’s 
participation in the abrogation of a treaty.”). 
 370.  Creedon v. Seele, 75 F. Supp. 767, 769 (S.D. Ill. 1947) (“I don’t believe it’s up to [the court] 
to say Congress is wrong or the president is wrong in a holding that the war has not been 
concluded.”). 
 371.  War for purposes of statutes and contracts has been read “to mean periods of significant 
armed conflict rather than times governed by formal declarations of war.”  Koohi v. United States, 
976 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Darnall v. Day, 37 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa 1949) 
(Insurance contract use of “after the war has ended” means “after hostilities have ceased,” because 
the common use of war “refers to the period of hostilities and not to a technical state of war which 
may exist after the fighting has ended.”). 
 372.  The Court has found that in the rare circumstance where an interbranch dispute affects 
private interests, the political question doctrine will not bar resolution even in foreign affairs.  See 
Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1427 (“The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy 
decision of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination of what United 
States policy toward Jerusalem should be.  Instead, Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a 
specific statutory right” that is alleged to be unconstitutionally infringing on an exclusive 
presidential power.). 
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of war terminates, and the legal rules applicable in such a circumstance, 
could vary depending upon whether the analysis is conducted through the 
prism of U.S. domestic law or international law.  Although this Article 
generally does not seek to examine the means or implications of war 
termination for the purposes of international law, it does analyze the U.S. 
domestic legal effect of either the President, Congress, or both recognizing, 
formally, the termination of the legal condition of war in this non-
international armed conflict.373   
More than twelve years after the attacks on September 11, 2001, the 
Obama administration has discussed publicly how and when the armed 
conflict against Al Qaeda and associated forces will end—while 
emphasizing that the conflict is not necessarily nearing the “beginning of the 
end.”374  First, U.S. Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson, 
delivered a speech at the Oxford Union on November 30, 2012, concerning 
the legal architecture underpinning this war, and stated that as a result of 
continued determination and action by U.S. forces, however, there will 
eventually come a “tipping point” where “so many leaders and operatives of 
al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured” that the organization 
will effectively be destroyed, lacking its capacity “to attempt or launch a 
strategic attack against the United States.”375  Significantly, General Counsel 
Johnson explained that: 
 At that [tipping] point, we must be able to say to ourselves that 
our efforts should no longer be considered an “armed conflict” 
against al Qaeda and its associated forces; rather, a counterterrorism 
effort against individuals who are the scattered remnants of al 
 
 373.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630-31 (2006) (stating that the U.S. is in a non-
international armed conflict with Al Qaeda).  Non-international armed conflict is “armed conflict not 
of an international character occurring in the territory of” a state party to the Geneva Convention.  
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.   
 374.  See Johnson, supra note 2 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Charlie Savage, Pentagon Counsel Speaks of Post-Qaeda Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, at 
A17; Julian E. Barnes, Pentagon Lawyer Looks Post-Terror, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2012, 4:49 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324205404578151181874456280.html; Daniel 
Klaidman, Will Obama End the War on Terror?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www.newsweek.com/will-obama-end-war-terror-63627; Eric Posner, The War on Terror Will 
Be Ever with Us, SLATE (Dec. 11, 2012, 11:56 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2012/12/jeh_johnson_is_wron
g_the_fight_with_al_qaida_continues.html.  
 375.  Johnson, supra note 2. 
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Qaeda, or are parts of groups unaffiliated with al Qaeda, for which 
the law enforcement and intelligence resources of our government 
are principally responsible, in cooperation with the international 
community—with our military assets available in reserve to address 
continuing and imminent terrorist threats.       
 At that point we will also need to face the question of what to do 
with any members of al Qaeda who still remain in U.S. military 
detention without a criminal conviction and sentence.  In general, 
the military’s authority to detain ends with the “cessation of active 
hostilities.”  For this particular conflict, all I can say today is that we 
should look to conventional legal principles to supply the answer, 
and that both our Nations faced similar challenging questions after 
the cessation of hostilities in World War II, and our governments 
delayed the release of some Nazi German prisoners of war.376   
As a matter of U.S. domestic law, the President’s authority—as 
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive—to detain combatants, who 
would re-enter the fight, is a clear corollary of the authority to use force.377   
 At that “tipping point” the U.S. government will face a range of legal 
questions that arise as the state of armed conflict draws to a close.  Given 
that, under international law, detention authority ends with the “cessation of 
active hostilities,”378 as a domestic constitutional matter, would such a 
cessation in this conflict require the immediate release of members of Al 
Qaeda who remain dangerous and who would be able to reconstitute a force 
that could attack the U.S.?  If not militarily necessary, some may ask, why 
should the U.S. be able to have these war powers?  What should be done to 
ensure the stability of the counterterrorism legal architecture at such a 
“tipping point?”  Once this “tipping point” approaches and is recognized by 
the President, Congress, or both, some commentators may ask how would 
 
 376.  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 377.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (“[I]t is of no moment that the AUMF 
does not use specific language of detention.  Because detention to prevent a combatant’s return to 
the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary and 
appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow 
circumstances considered here.”). 
 378.  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of War shall be released and repatriated without 
delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”). 
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the U.S. government “apply the laws of war where no war . . . exists?”379    
A.  Locus of Authority to Determine That a War Has Ended 
1.  Congress and the President 
The Constitution does not address war termination powers explicitly, 
but vests at least some war powers in both Congress and the Executive.  The 
Declare War Clause explicitly vests at least some war initiation power in the 
legislative branch.380  No parallel war termination power exists in the 
Constitution.  The Constitution’s text, court precedents, and executive and 
legislative branch practice may help determine whether Congress, the 
President, or both must be involved in the official proclamation that a war 
has ended.  On the one hand, Congress faces “practical limitations on [its] 
capacity to forge ex ante standards for executive national security action,”381 
as compared to the Executive’s relative ability to respond swiftly.382  On the 
other hand, the Constitution has allocated specific foreign relations powers 
to Congress.383   
2.  Sparse Judicial Guidance 
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance concerning 
determinations of whether a war has technically concluded, preferring to 
show significant judicial deference to the political branches’ assessment.384  
In 1948, the Supreme Court held in, Ludecke v. Watkins, that the legal state 
of war is terminated not merely by a cessation of hostilities, but by the 
President, Congress, or both.385  Specifically, the Court ruled that the legal 
condition of war—at least in the constitutional sense—can be terminated by 
a peace treaty, congressional legislation that recognizes an end to the war, or 
a presidential proclamation that the war has ended.386  Thus, the Ludecke 
 
 379.  See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 140 (1866) (Chase, C.J., dissenting). 
 380.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 381.  See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 294, at 848. 
 382.  See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321–22 (1936). 
 383.   See supra note 296. 
 384.  See, e.g., supra note 222.   
 385.  See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166–68 (1948); supra note 137. 
 386.  See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 168–69; supra note 139.   
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court accepted that President Truman’s authority to detain German nationals 
extended beyond Germany’s unconditional surrender.387  The Court viewed 
the technical termination of the use of war powers to detain as the date of the 
enactment of pertinent legislation in 1951.388  Commentators have looked to 
Supreme Court precedent as authority that conflicts must be terminated by 
either the President or a combination of the President and Congress.389 
Courts have provided only limited guidance regarding the authority to 
end war and tend to defer to the political branches on issues relating to 
separation of powers and foreign relations.  The Constitution vests war 
powers in the Executive and Congress, rather than in the courts.390  Courts 
have often looked to the practice of the political branches as a persuasive 
factor in contentious separation of powers questions.391  This judicial 
practice is even more commonplace in issues related to foreign affairs.392     
Determining the extent to which one can draw legal conclusions from 
congressional intent is particularly significant today.  The AUMF does not 
include a sunset clause, which some scholars argue serves to show that 
Congress did not intend to set a time limit on the President’s actions.393   
3.  History of Collaboration Through Peace Treaty-Making 
Historically, wars ended with peace treaties that required the Senate to 
give advice and consent to the President—a process that provided the 
 
 387.  See generally United States v. Hicks, 256 F. 707, 710–11 (W.D. Ky. 1919). 
 388.  See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 168–69 (“‘The state of war’ may be terminated by treaty or 
legislation or Presidential proclamation.  Whatever the mode, its termination is a political act.  
Whether and when it would be open to this Court to find that a war though merely formally kept 
alive had in fact ended, is a question too fraught with gravity even to be adequately formulated when 
not compelled.”  (citations omitted)). 
 389.  See, e.g., supra notes 111–12. 
 390.  See supra note 296. 
 391.  See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also supra note 293.  See generally supra note 287. 
 392.  See supra note 297. 
 393.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 68, at 2123 (drawing the conclusion that the fact that 
the AUMF “does not purport to limit the time period in which the President can act,” based partly on 
the fact that the AUMF does not include a sunset clause as Congress has provided for in the past).  
They argue that the authorization’s open-endedness was intentional, and that Congress declined to 
include a sunset clause as included in the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act of 2002.  Id.; see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: 
Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 449 (2011) (discussing sunset 
provisions in congressional authorizations for the use of military force).  
[Vol. 41: 685, 2014] Ending Perpetual War? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
761 
framework for such collaboration in ending wars.  In early U.S. history, the 
central mechanism for ending a war was a peace treaty.394  Congress 
remained involved in the process during World War I, engaging actively in 
the debates surrounding the Treaty of Versailles; since World War II, 
however, Congress has played a more limited role in recognizing that a war 
has ended.395 
Today, however, there is no formal method for involving congressional 
collaboration that is equivalent to ratifying a peace treaty to terminate a 
war.396  It may be that Congress may rely on the power of the purse or on 
repealing the authorization for use of force as ways to try to pull back on 
executive powers.397  However, neither is an adequate substitute for the 
treaty process, not least because—absent a two-thirds majority of voting 
members—such congressional initiatives could face potential defeat by a 
presidential veto.398   
4.  Benefits of Congressional Engagement 
There are benefits to having congressional engagement in terminating a 
conflict, and there are mechanisms short of a peace treaty for such 
interbranch cooperation.  The treaty-making power has historically been the 
primary mechanism for the U.S. government to proclaim the end to a 
conflict in a way that allowed for debate in Congress, and between Congress 
and the Executive to shape the policy surrounding the termination of a 
war.399  There are, however, alternate ways in which the U.S. may benefit 
from the strengths of an interdependent system between separate branches of 
government.  Consultation, negotiations, and cooperation can be promoted 
through formal or informal processes aimed at terminating a conflict.400  
Potential methods of increasing such interdependence range from 
 
 394.  See supra note 10. 
 395.  See Mathews, supra note 11, at 822–23.  
 396.  Cf. Mosier, supra note 52, at 1620. 
 397.  See id. at 1625–26. 
 398.  See id. at 1624–27. 
 399.  See id. at 1613. 
 400.  See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 776 
(1997) (arguing that “[n]othing in the Constitution suggests that the Congress may engage in 
political debate with the President only through formal legislation.”).  But cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (holding that the legislative veto was unlawful as laws must comport with 
Article I’s established procedures). 
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introducing legislation requiring disclosure and creating reporting 
requirements401 to holding hearings and informal efforts to engage in 
dialogue.402  For example, the President may disclose pertinent facts or 
potential actions regarding ending a war, and Congress may legislate to 
encourage such disclosures.403  Congress exercises supervisory powers over 
wars through mechanisms—such as, reporting requirements, congressional 
hearings, and closed and open session briefings.404  One aim of disclosure is 
to provide the congressional branch—and the public—the opportunity to 
contribute to the dialogue before a final decision has been made.405   
 
 401.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY POWER OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2007) (“Section 1202, ‘Annual Report on Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China,’ of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public 
Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report ‘on the current and future 
military strategy of the People’s Republic of China.  The report shall address the current and 
probable future course of military-technological development on the People’s Liberation Army and 
the tenets and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military 
strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years.’” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 402.  Cf. ELY, supra note 159, at 109; DOUGLAS L. KRINER, AFTER THE RUBICON: CONGRESS, 
PRESIDENTS, AND THE POLITICS OF WAGING WAR 285 (2010) (arguing that “members of Congress 
have historically engaged in a variety of actions from formal initiatives, such as introducing 
legislation or holding hearings that challenge the president’s conduct of military action, to informal 
efforts to shape the nature of the policy debate [on wars].”); William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, 
Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 209, 228–29 (2005); Aziz Z. Huq, 
Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 781 (2012) (arguing that 
“[e]ven in military matters, a growing body of empirical research suggests Congress often 
successfully influences the course of overseas engagements to a greater degree than legal scholars 
have discerned or acknowledged.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1349, 1417 (2011). 
 403.  See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (The War Powers Resolution requires 
periodic reporting as well as a written report from the President within forty-eight hours “[i]n the 
absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by 
the circumstances; (2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for 
combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of 
such forces; or (3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for 
combat already located in a foreign nation.”  The report must include: “(A) the circumstances 
necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative 
authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the 
hostilities or involvement.”). 
 404.  For example, during the final chapters of the second Iraq war, the executive branch briefed 
relevant congressional committees regarding a range of matters on numerous occasions.  See supra 
note 186 and accompanying text.  
 405.   See Sunstein, supra note 402, at 1417 (describing disclosure as a “regulatory tool,” and 
stating that “[w]ell-designed disclosure policies attempt to convey information clearly and at the 
time when it is needed. . . . Well-designed disclosure policies are preceded by a careful analysis of 
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Justice Robert Jackson, in his famous Youngstown concurrence, stated 
that the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but 
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”406  When separate branches of 
government share authority over a decision there is arguably a greater 
potential for collaboration, as well as an increased likelihood that each 
branch will exercise greater care to avoid usurping decision-making 
power.407  The Constitution grants both the Executive and Congress powers 
in the sphere of warfare, and does not explicitly refer to separate war 
termination powers.  Should the executive branch arrogate all war 
termination power, this would diminish not only the influence of the 
deliberative branch, but also the potential benefits of a system of checks and 
balances.408   
The President may have the authority to proclaim an end to a conflict 
without congressional action based on article II executive powers and 
supported by a history of congressional acquiescence—however, from a 
separation of powers perspective, some congressional engagement in the 
process is preferable.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In assessing how and when the President and Congress can end war, it is 
necessary to determine the constitutional role of each political branch in 
exercising war termination powers.  This Article has attempted to outline a 
 
their likely effects.”). 
 406.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 407.  See Lobel, supra note 22, at 393 (elaborating on the ways in which Congress and the 
President can be influential within their “concurrent power to conduct warfare”); see also Daryl J. 
Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 950 (2005) 
(contending that “[t]he trick is to link the self-aggrandizing motives of government officials to the 
power of their branches.  Given ‘the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments,’ Madison argues, the ambitions of the officials who comprise each of the branches 
will ‘counteract’ one another.  The result will be a balanced equilibrium, in which no branch can 
accumulate a potentially monarchical or tyrannical quantum of power, try as each of them will.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 408.  Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial 
Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 222 (1990) (arguing that “Congress and the President would do better 
to seek to resolve their separation of powers disputes by negotiating them in good faith . . . .  
Negotiated resolutions of specific disagreements can decide smaller questions in ways that create a 
foundation for similarly informal arrangements of future interbranch differences while recognizing 
the contrasting interests of the governmental institutions involved.”). 
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framework for interpreting the constitutional war termination powers of 
Congress and the President, and then to apply this framework to the war 
against Al Qaeda and its associated forces.  This Article’s framework 
suggests that, in theory, ending war without meaningful cooperation between 
the President and Congress generates tension with the principle of the 
separation of powers underpinning the American constitutional system, with 
the Framers’ division of the treaty-making authority, and with the values 
they enshrine.  
Although the Constitution does not explain, nor are there any clear legal 
precedents addressing, the issue of which branch of the federal government 
should have the final say in determining whether an armed conflict has 
ended, the President and Congress can and should play significant roles in 
resolving legal questions associated with the termination of the “armed 
conflict” with Al Qaeda.  In practice, this Article’s framework reflects that 
requiring the participation of both Congress and the President in the war 
termination process has the political benefit of ensuring more transparent 
and accountable decision making, even though such collaborative 
engagement may make it more difficult to terminate a war.  As this Article 
has explained, the treaty-making process represents an approach to war 
termination that best reflects the constitutional values of the interdependence 
of the political branches, while checking interbranch rivalry and preserving 
the constitutional and foreign relations prerogatives of Congress and the 
President.   
Cooperative action by the two political branches also ensures that the 
decision to end a war is not regarded as political opportunism or a coercive 
exercise of power over another branch of government.  Joint action provides 
more than mere political cover—it puts the full imprimatur of the political 
branches of government on a decision to terminate a war and establishes that 
it is the U.S. that has ordained peace, rather than one squabbling branch of 
government.  It increases the likelihood that peace will be lasting—if a war 
is ended in fact, but not in law, there is no guarantee that fighting will not 
simply commence once political fortunes change.  Consequently, a dual 
branch war termination also establishes certainty by definitively ending a 
state of war.  
 
